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Introduction:  
Is friendship necessary for marriage  
or does romantic passion suffice? 
 
Healthy and happy marriages seem to be declining in our days even here in the United States: 
Statistics chart the rapid and terminal decomposition of the family in the United States.  From 
1970 to 1989 the divorce rate rose more than 40%, since 1940 by 250%.  In 1960 only 5% of all 
births were out of wedlock; by 1985 out-of-wedlock births climbed to 22% (a number deflated by 
the 1.5 million babies murdered in the womb that year by legal abortion).  In 1960 more than 80% 
of married women with children under six devoted themselves exclusively to domestic duties; by 
1980 these homemakers were in the minority.  In 1977, nearly 80% of America’s children lived 
with both parents.  Now, only two-thirds of them do.  Of all families with children, nearly 29% 
are now one-parent families, up from 17% in 1977.  Finally, from 1970 to 2004 the annual 
number of marriages per 1,000 adult women in the United States plunged by nearly 50%.1 
 
Divorce, out of wedlock births, one parent families, etc.—these statistics indicate that the 
vocation of marriage is suffering a crisis in the United States.  The statistics are staggering.  
While it can be helpful to look back to the recent past for reasons why this may be occurring 
locally, an adequate answer to this crisis cannot be given without looking much further back in 
                                                          
1 G. C. Dilsaver. The Three Marks of Manhood: How to be Priest, Prophet, and King of Your Family. (Charlotte, 
North Carolina: TAN Books, 2010): 2-3; cf. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, 
Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), 1:20, 64; U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1988, 108th ed. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1987), 59, 62, 83, 373, 374. 
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human history to understand how we were made—for what purpose—and what happened in the 
meantime. 
 
Why and how the problem got started 
In the Garden of Eden, the first married couple would have experienced perfect spousal 
friendship and expressed love fully to one another.  Man and woman were made in the image and 
likeness of God—with dignity and equality.2  Yet, the fall of mankind into sin has ruptured the 
relationships between human persons and God, between human persons and one another and 
even within the person’s very self.3  The proper ordering of Man’s intellect over the lower 
appetites—passions and emotions—has given way to an inner chaos.4  We no longer do what we 
ought but sometimes choose things opposed to our true good.  We have a tendency to reduce 
other persons’ intrinsic value merely for the sake of attaining some perceived good which—in 
the end—may even have been much less a good than the good sacrificed to attain it.   
In his book, The World’s First Love, Archbishop Fulton Sheen wrote that: 
Behind this rebellion or disobedience [of creatures to] God, there are two basic assumptions.  The 
first is, that the intelligence invents or originates truth, and that is does not discover or find it.  In 
the nineteenth century it was very common for materialists to believe that they originated the 
laws of nature because they discovered them.  They forgot that the scientist is, actually, a 
proofreader of the book of Nature, and not its author.  The second assumption is that 
subordination to another implies subjection.  This implies a denial of all degrees and hierarchy in 
                                                          
2 cf. Genesis 1:26-31 
3 With particular relevance to this essay, spouses are called upon to imitate the profound love of God.  It is not 
irrelevant that Jesus Christ became Incarnate as a man—it was precisely in doing so that He was able to repair the 
ruptures of masculinity and femininity caused by Original Sin.  As Dr. Lemmons wrote: “Ending male oppression 
requires Christ to reveal to men, and to women, that the mission of masculinity lies not in egotistical domination but 
in the continual laying down of one’s life for the sake of love” (Lemmons, “Equality, Gender and John Paul II,” 
118). 
4 By virtue of the Fall, the powers of our nature are weakened and we are “subject to ignorance, suffering, and the 
domination of death; and inclined to sin” (Catholic Church. Catechism of the Catholic Church. (Vatican: Libreria 
Editrice Vaticana, 2000): 418). 
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nature and in creation, and the reduction of mankind to an egalitarianism, in which each man is a 
god.5  
 
Although these two basic assumptions are first manifested in the sin of Adam and Eve, they 
continue to be promulgated by every act of disobedience against God throughout human history.  
The first of these basic assumptions pertains to the attempt on the part of a creature to assume the 
role of his Creator—to grasp at divinity.  The second is the consequence of the disorder that 
results from having overturned the objective order established by God in creating the world.  An 
unfortunate consequence of this second assumption is that sinners do not easily see that 
subordination does not automatically entail subjection.  In elevating the individual and denying a 
hierarchy of nature, Man has corrupted the moral order, ironically even subjecting persons to 
subjection.  In particular, the Original Sin described in Genesis affects the spousal relationship 
such that the husband’s tendency will be to dominate his wife while the wife’s tendency will be 
to an unhealthy submission to her husband’s lordship over her.6   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Fulton J. Sheen. The World’s First Love.  (Garden City, NY: Garden City Books, 1952) 83-84. 
6 cf. Genesis 3:16; in her essay, “Equality, Gender, and John Paul II” Dr. R. Mary Hayden Lemmons writes of the 
specific effect that the rupture of sin caused on the spousal relationship as it is addressed in Genesis after Adam and 
Eve’s fall into sin.  She writes: “Genesis 3:16 is quite explicit that some penalties of Original Sin are gender-
specific, affecting even the spousal union of love: ‘Your desire shall be for your husband, and he shall rule over 
you.’ In other words, Original Sin left woman with the desire to close her love in upon her husband and make him 
the lord, while Original Sin left men with the desire to dominate women. Yielding to either desire is the wellspring 
of all gender sins—even in today’s world.” R. Mary Hayden Lemmons. “Equality, Gender, and John Paul II.” 
(Logos vol. 5 (Summer 2002)): 115.  Such confusion about subordination can hinder the fruition of successful and 
healthy marriages.  Acknowledging the reality of sin and its effects on one’s own self and on the spousal 
relationship helps couples to recognize certain unhealthy dispositions that may exist in themselves and deepen their 
relationship through a deeper integration of truth. 
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In our own time 
The crisis noted earlier in this Introduction indicates that people in our culture who live the 
vocation of marriage have many trials to face.  Those trials cannot be understood in a way that 
disavows the role of sin in corrupting the human will and desires.  Our modern culture is moving 
away from a fundamentally Christian conception of marriage and there are many negative 
consequences that follow.  Archbishop Sheen wrote: 
Since the abandonment of the Christian conception of marriage, both man and woman have 
forgotten their mission.  Purity has become identified with repression, instead of being seen as it 
really is—the reverence for preserving a mystery of creativeness until God sanctions the use of 
that power.  While man is outgoing in his pleasure, womanly purity keeps hers inward, channeled 
or even self-possessed, as if a great secret had to be hugged to the heart.  There is no conflict 
between purity and carnal pleasure in blessed unions, for desire, pleasure, and purity each has its 
place.7 
 
Marriage does not restrict authentic love, but facilitates its fruitful expression.  It is within the 
context of marriage that all the experiences of both purity and carnal pleasure can be expressed; 
for no conflict exists between desire, pleasure and purity when they find expression in married 
love.  The idea that marriage would restrict the expression of authentic love is entirely 
backwards.  Archbishop Sheen’s words were, in a sense, prophetic.  The book in which his 
words are written was composed only shortly after some of the earliest (and most hopeful 
looking) statistics quoted earlier in this Introduction were recorded.  If the statistics are to halt 
their decline, something needs to be done to safeguard the sanctity of marriage and to represent 
the true nature of love as we have learned it from God Himself.8   
                                                          
7 Sheen, 135 
8 Understanding the nature of God’s love is helpful for those who are called to imitate that love by extending it to 
God and one another.  Archbishop Fulton J. Sheen presents seven “laws” of love corresponding to the seven verbal 
pronouncements of Mary in the New Testament.  These are: (1) love is a choice, (2) choice ends in identification 
with the beloved, (3) love requires a constant de-egoization, (4) love is inseparable from joy, (5) love is inseparable 
from sorrow, (6) all love, before it mounts to a higher level, must die to a lower one, and (7) the end of all human 
love is doing the will of God (Sheen, 137-142). 
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In this essay, I argue that a specific kind of friendship, spousal friendship, is necessary for 
marriage.  To base the spousal relationship on the experience of romantic passion alone is to 
attempt to set something that is meant to be enduring upon unstable foundations.  Romantic 
passion is itself rooted in the emotions—which are fleeting.  Relationships that are based solely 
on romantic passion tend by their nature toward the reduction of the other person to a mere 
object of one’s use—and this is beneath human dignity.  Thus, relationships that rest upon 
romantic passion alone do not foster the love that is proper to the spousal relationship.  For these 
reasons, the first chapter of this essay will attempt to show that romantic passion alone is 
insufficient for the spousal relationship. 
The second chapter of this essay will argue that spousal friendship is crucial to marriage 
for two reasons: (1) to prevent the harms mentioned in the discussion of romantic passion, and 
(2) to foster a healthy context for the growth and fruition of betrothed love.  Marriage facilitates 
spousal friendship—though it does not automatically cause it to be.  Spousal friendship 
facilitates betrothed love and develops into it.  Betrothed love is a deeper expression of spousal 
love than even the spousal friendship itself; yet spousal friendship may be said to be ordered to 
the expression of betrothed love.  In betrothed love, each spouse makes a total self-gift to the 
other that is characterized by the healthy submission of their ‘I’ in imitation of the radical self-
giving that characterizes the love exchanged in the Trinitarian relationship. 
The role of friendship with God in sustaining and strengthening the spousal relationship 
is taken up in the third chapter of this essay.  Friendship with God can both precede the entire 
process of a man and woman’s growth in intimacy and friendship (at least on some level) and 
deepen through it—though this is not always the case.  Since spousal intimacy is itself meant to 
6 
 
be a reflection of divine intimacy, participating in the love of God through friendship with Him 
is crucial to the deepest forms of intimacy between persons in marriage.   
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Chapter I:  
Why romantic passion alone  
cannot sustain the spousal relationship. 
 
The present chapter of this essay will explore the nature of romantic passion and why a 
relationship based upon it alone cannot sustain the spousal relationship.  We shall here explore 
the kinds of attraction, forms of loves and relationships arising from those loves.  In the end, 
however, it should be clear that romantic passion cannot alone sustain the spousal relationship. 
 
Romantic passion focuses attention merely on oneself and how the other meets one’s needs 
The nature of what I have called “romantic passion” is analyzed by Karol Wojtyla (1920-
2005AD; known today as Saint John Paul II) from a phenomenological perspective in his book, 
Love and Responsibility.9  “Love…” he writes, “signifies a mutual relationship between two 
people, a man and a woman, based on a particular attitude to the good.”10  The attitude to the 
                                                          
9 Insofar as Karol Wojtyla is better known to the world today as Saint John Paul II, I shall henceforth refer to the 
text’s author by this name and not Karol Wojtyla.  However, the specific footnote citations made in the footnotes of 
this essay will still list the name Karol Wojtyla.  
10 Karol Wojtyla. Love and Responsibility. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1981) 74.  
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good upon which this relationship is based is itself born of an attraction11 experienced by the 
persons toward one another wherein each sees the other as ‘a good’ for himself.  The ease with 
which the attraction arises in a man for a woman or a woman for a man (or both) is a 
consequence of the sexual urge operating in the individual experiencing the attraction.12   
By nature of the sexual urge, men and women are “particularly oriented toward the 
physiological and psychological qualities of a person of the opposite sex—their body and their 
masculinity or femininity.”13  Thus there are two kinds of attractions: one physical and one 
emotional.  John Paul II calls the physical attraction—to the body of a person of the opposite 
sex—sensuality; whereas, he calls the emotional attraction—to the masculinity or femininity of a 
person of the opposite sex—sentimentality.14  Attraction of either form is not bad in itself and 
can be the means through which one person is drawn to another person.  Yet, in themselves, 
these attractions do not constitute authentic love, though they may facilitate its origin and 
expression.   
                                                          
11 In Love and Responsibility, Wojtyla writes that attraction entails more than a purely cognitive experience.  Apart 
from the intellection and cognitive components, attraction also includes “the emotions and the will.”  Wojtyla, 75.  
“Attraction involves the senses, the mind, the will, the emotions and desires.”  Edward Sri. Men, Women and the 
Mystery of Love (Cincinnati, OH: Servant Books, 2007) 32. 
12 Wojtyla, 74 
13 Sri, 32 
14 Sri, 32 
9 
 
Sensuality and sentimentality 
While sensual attraction taken on its own, may be considered “a sort of raw material for true, 
conjugal love” it cannot, by itself, constitute authentic love since the object that it seeks [by 
itself] is only the body: “sensuality in itself is quite blind to the person.”15  This sensual attraction 
for the body of the other person is “often characterized by a longing to enjoy the body of another 
person [merely] as an object of pleasure.”16 
Sentimental attraction, like sensual attraction, has an important role to play in authentic 
love; authentic love ought to involve the integration of emotions.17  Yet, like sensual attraction, 
sentimental attraction also presents a possible danger: the enslavement of the individual to his 
own emotions.  Sentimentality tends towards making emotions the “measure for love.”18  Similar 
to the blindness of sensuality to the person, sentimentality—which allows one’s feelings to 
govern his actions—can also blind him to the person.  His feelings threaten to blind him to the 
truth.19  Blindness to the truth leads to the creation of disingenuous idealizations of the one being 
loved.  In such cases, John Paul II writes:  
 
                                                          
15 Wojtyla, 108 
16 Sri, 41 
17 Wojtyla elaborates on what sentimental love between two people can look like: “Sentimental love keeps two 
people close together, binds them – even if they are physically apart – to move in each other’s orbit.  This love 
embraces memory and imagination, and also communicates itself to the will.  It does not arouse the will, but charms 
and disarms it” (Wojtyla, 110-111).  Wotjyla goes on to explain that when people in this state are physically 
separated, they are mentally together; when they are physically together, they find ways of externally manifesting 
the internal desires they experience.  Expression of such affection is entirely compatible with the experience of 
authentic and conjugal love. 
18 Sri, 44 
19 Truth is discovered through the exercise of reason and not through emotion. 
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The ideal is more powerful than the real, living human being, and the latter often becomes merely 
the occasion for an eruption in the subject’s emotional consciousness of the values which he or 
she longs with all his heart to find in another person.  It does not matter whether they are really 
values possessed by the particular person towards whom the subject feels a sentimental love.  For 
that person… is less the object of than the occasion for affection.20  
 
If a relationship is based upon either sensuality or sentimentality alone, the relationship is based 
upon self-gratification.  An individual in such a relationship pursues something that is good for 
himself without considering what the genuine good is for the other.  A relationship of this sort is 
one in which the other person is used by the individual to attain the end—whether of sensual or 
sentimental attraction—for which the individual’s desire has roused him.  It would be a mistake 
of logic to argue that if both individuals mutually chose to ‘use’ one another in such a way, then 
the nature of the relationship would change.   
 
Loves for pleasure and utility 
In his book titled Nicomachean Ethics, the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle argued that there 
are three kinds of ‘friendship’ characterized by three kinds of affection that unite people in 
relationships: (1) love for the sake of utility; (2) love for the sake of pleasure; (3) love of the 
other for the other’s own sake.21  Similar to the two kinds of attractions addressed by John Paul 
II, these three kinds of ‘friendship’ are not themselves bad, but the first two (utility and pleasure) 
are prone to disintegration when existing by themselves.22  Aristotle argues that such 
                                                          
20 Wojtyla, 112 (emphasis added). 
21 cf. Aristotle, 1156a 
22 The third kind of friendship will be taken up in the next chapter of this essay dealing with “why and how spousal 
friendship is necessary to prevent disintegration.” 
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relationships are sustained only as long as the experience of passion or the utility itself (from 
which those relationships arise) is sustained.23   
 
Love for the sake of utility 
Love for the sake of utility does not require loving the other in himself; this relationship is built 
rather upon the foundation of some advantage which is gained through it, even if the other’s 
company is unpleasant.24  In such a case, once its usefulness is served and ended, so too is this 
friendship ended.25  Therefore, this form of relationship only endures so long as the need to 
which it supplies a response endures.  If the relationship between the individuals endures beyond 
                                                          
23 The first two of these species of friendship are “transient” and the third species of friendship – the friendship of 
comrades – can incorporate the goods of the first two because it looks beyond them to the true good of the other.   
Similarly, St. Thomas Aquinas writes that “when friendship is based on usefulness or pleasure, a man does 
indeed wish his friend some good: and in this respect the character of friendship is preserved.  But since he refers 
this good further to his own pleasure or use, the result is that friendship of the useful or pleasant, in so far as it is 
connected with love of concupiscence, loses the character of true friendship” (Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia IIae 
Q. 26 A. 4. 
24 This form of relationship is most commonly found among older people who “pursue what is advantageous, not 
what is pleasant, and also among those in their prime or youth who pursue what is expedient” (Aristotle, 1156a). 
 A practical example of a relationship of utility which alone forms the foundations of a spousal relationship 
is the husband and wife whose spousal relationship is founded upon their mutual desire for the welfare of their 
children.  Spousal relationships of this kind—founded upon the mutual desire for the welfare of the children—tend 
toward disintegration sometime after the children have vacated their parents’ home.  Such relationships may even 
produce stressful familial environments, since the marital commitment to which the spouses have committed 
themselves—each to the other—naturally entails a level of intimacy beyond the subjective experience of their own 
relationship. 
25 As Aristotle says, “Those who are friends for utility dissolve the friendship as soon as the advantage is removed; 
for they were never friends of each other, but of what was expedient for them” (Aristotle, 1157a). 
12 
 
its utility, then the endurance of the relationship must be explained by the formation of some 
other kind of friendship.26    
Friendships of utility are liable to accusation due to the nature of the relationship.27  “For 
these friends deal with each other in the expectation of gaining benefits.  Hence they always 
require more, thinking they have got less than is fitting; and they reproach the other because they 
get less than they require and deserve.  And those who confer benefits cannot supply as much as 
the recipients require.”28  In a friendship of utility, one may offer another a gift, as would friends 
in a friendship of virtue might, but it is a gift given with the expectation of receiving something 
of equal or greater value in return.29  While most people desire to do “what is fine,” they will end 
up choosing what is beneficial for themselves in the end.30   
In friendships of utility, something is given with the expectation of something to be 
received.  When something is given and nothing is received, a dispute will arise and it may lead 
to the termination of the relationship.  In these relationships, when an inequality is present, “the 
superior person should get more honor, and the needy person more profit, since honor is the 
reward of virtue and beneficence, while profit is what supplies need.”31 
 
 
                                                          
26 Disputes will arise in the surface level friendships (and especially in friendships of utility) which will lead to the 
dissolution of the relationship (Aristotle, 1163a). 
27 Aristotle even goes a step further to say that “accusations and reproaches arise only or most often in friendship for 
utility” (Aristotle, 1162b; emphasis added). 
28 Aristotle, 1162b 
29 Aristotle, 1162b 
30 Aristotle, 1162b-1163a 
31 Aristotle, 1163a 
13 
 
Love for the sake of pleasure 
Love for the sake of pleasure similarly does not require loving the other for the other’s own sake; 
this kind of relationship is based solely upon the pleasurability (or delight) it provides to the 
individuals at the time.32  Unlike friendships of utility, not many accusations arise “among 
friends for pleasure.  For [each friend gets] what they want at the same time if they enjoy 
spending their time together; and someone who accused his friend of not pleasing him would 
appear ridiculous, when he is free to spend his days without the friend’s company.”33  With the 
passing of time, what people in relationships of pleasure perceived to be pleasurable will change 
as they themselves change.34  As this change occurs, the relationships built upon foundations of 
pleasure will collapse and they will be compelled to build new ones if the relationship is going to 
survive.35 
The passions which bind the man and woman in superficial intimacy with one another for 
a time are fleeting and pass away.36  If the sole foundation upon which relationship is built is 
                                                          
32 This form of friendship is most commonly among young people who “are guided by their feelings, and they 
pursue above all what is pleasant for themselves and what is near at hand” (Aristotle, 1156a).  Aristotle further says 
of young people that they “are prone to erotic passion, since this mostly follows feelings, and is caused by pleasure; 
that is why they love and quickly stop, often changing in a single day” (Aristotle, 1156b).   
An example of a spousal relationship built upon the foundation of the love for the sake of pleasure alone is 
a relationship between a very attractive young woman and a very handsome young man; perhaps each finds himself 
emotionally aroused by the other.  In the state of emotional ecstasy, they may be very amiable toward one another.  
But, once the pleasure of the other is removed (beauty, charm, etc.) their relationship will fall apart since the 
pleasure which produced and sustained the relationship is no longer present. 
33 Aristotle, 1162b 
34 As one’s desires change and develop over time, so too what he perceives and experiences as pleasurable changes. 
35 In friendships of pleasure, the association between friends is grounded in the pleasure mutually experienced.  
Once this pleasure no longer exists for one or both parties, the relationship is terminated. 
36 While the relationship lasts, they will desire to be in the company of the other.  Once the pleasure upon which the 
relationship was based crumbles, the relationship is dissolved. 
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pleasure, then the relationship constructed by pleasure will die when the pleasure dies.  While 
friendships of pleasure do not necessarily entail the presence of erotic love, nevertheless, it 
seems to be within this kind of friendship that eros finds its most akin expression. 
 
Erotic love related to the love of pleasure 
Having explored the kinds of relationships arising from one’s sensual and sentimental 
attractions, it is important to consider more closely the distinction of the kind of love from which 
those attractions arise.  As many of the foundations of John Paul II’s presentation are laid by the 
ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle, it is fitting that we turn to Greek terminology to find these 
distinctions.  The vocabulary of ancient Greece distinguished several forms of love by terms that 
have no direct English equivalent.  Three of these are particularly pertinent to the present 
exploration of love and relationship; these are: philia, eros, and agape.  Philía (φιλία) is the 
“love of friendship;”37 érōs (ἔρως) is the “possessive or covetous love;”38 agápē (ἀγάπη) is the 
“oblative” love.39  What this essay understands to be romantic passion is expressed through eros 
love.   
In his first encyclical, Pope Benedict XVI wrote that “love between man and woman 
which is neither planned nor willed, but somehow imposes itself upon human beings, was 
                                                          
37 Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est [On Christian Love]. (Accessed October 1, 2014, http://www.vatican.va/ 
holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20051225_deus-caritas-est_en.html). 3; it may be 
worth noting that Benedict mentions philia only twice in the document.  His focus is primarily on eros and agape. 
38 Benedict XVI, 7 
39 Benedict XVI, 7; Aristotle does not refer to eros or agape at all in his writing on the love of friendship in the 
Nicomachean Ethics.   
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called eros by the ancient Greeks.”40  While being common to the human experience, eros is not 
always beneficial; it has the potential, as Stephen Brett put it, to either jeopardize or even betray 
authentic friendship by tending towards an “amorphous abstraction”—the distortion of the life of 
the subject.41  The amorphous abstraction described by Brett can be found in the fertility cults of 
the ancient world, as Benedict XVI explains: 
The Greeks—not unlike other cultures—considered eros principally as a kind of intoxication, the 
overpowering of reason by a “divine madness” which tears man away from his finite existence 
and enables him, in the very process of being overwhelmed by divine power, to experience 
supreme happiness. All other powers in heaven and on earth thus appear secondary… [But] this 
counterfeit divinization of eros actually strips it of its dignity and dehumanizes it. Indeed, the 
prostitutes in the temple, who had to bestow this divine intoxication, were not treated as human 
beings and persons, but simply used as a means of arousing “divine madness”: far from being 
goddesses, they were human persons being exploited. An intoxicated and undisciplined eros, 
then, is not an ascent in “ecstasy” towards the Divine, but a fall, a degradation of man. 
Evidently, eros needs to be disciplined and purified if it is to provide not just fleeting pleasure, 
but a certain foretaste of the pinnacle of our existence, of that beatitude for which our whole 
being yearns.42 
 
It is possible, then, for the erotic and otherwise fleeting love to be purified.  If the love of each 
person is thus purified, then it seems there is cause for hope that a relationship initially formed 
upon foundations of erotic love may grow into a relationship of agape or self-giving love.  Eros 
is not being inhibited from its fruition by its submission to agape, but is being purified to attain 
its elevated status in service to the good of persons.  If not subjected to purification, eros does 
not serve the good of persons but subjects one to another, reducing each to the status of a mere 
object for the use of the other. 
 
                                                          
40 Benedict XVI, 3 
41 Stephen F. Brett, “Eros and the Encyclical.” Homiletic and Pastoral Review (Aug/Sept 2006) 16. 
42 Benedict XVI, 4 
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Neglecting the good of the other leads to disintegration 
As stated above, Aristotle believes that friendships of either utility or pleasure (or both together) 
by themselves cannot be sustained beyond the endurance of either pleasure or utility from which 
they originated.  A relationship of self-gratification—even if it is a situation of mutual self-
gratification—cannot be sustained; neglecting the good of the other leads to the disintegration of 
the relationship even as it reduces the individual persons to the status of mere objects of use. 
Indeed, no human being can satisfy the desires of the human heart that longs for infinite 
goodness.  Hence, we should heed Pius XI who wrote in Casti Canubii that spouses should seek 
to aid one another in the pursuit of mutual perfection.43  Yet, this is not the aim of relationships 
of erotic passion in which each person seeks his own ends without duly regarding the goods of 
the other.  Nor is it the aim of a relationship that uses the other person for the sheer value of his 
utility.  Such self-seeking love does not suffice for marriage, as Pius XI writes: 
The love [of spouses] is not that based on the passing lust of the moment nor does it consist in 
pleasing words only, but in the deep attachment of the heart which is expressed in action, since 
love is proved by deeds.44 This outward expression of love in the home demands not only mutual 
help but must go further; must have as its primary purpose that man and wife help each other day 
by day in forming and perfecting themselves in the interior life, so that through their partnership 
in life they may advance ever more and more in virtue.45 
 
The love Pius XI writes of is proved by deeds and expressed in action.  Such love is enduring 
“day by day;” it does not built upon the foundation of a “passing lust,” nor does it necessitate the 
presence of pleasure (though it does not exclude the possibility that pleasure be present).  Such 
                                                          
43 Lisa Fullam. “Toward a Virtue Ethics of Marriage: Augustine and Aquinas on Friendship in Marriage.” 
Theological Studies (2012) 667. 
44 cf. St. Gregory the Great, Homii. XXX in Evang (John XIV,23-31), n.1. 
45 Pius XI, Casti Canubii [On Christian Marriage], (Accessed October 13, 2014, http://www.vatican.va 
/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_31121930_casti-connubii_en.html). 23 (emphasis added). 
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enduring love, necessary for marriage, is of an entirely different sort than the love which is 
described under the categories of this chapter as romantic passion.  Rather, what is needed is a 
love that is rooted in the will, a love that will not vanish with the passing of pleasure, utility or 
emotions; what is needed is the love of spousal friendship. 
 
Disintegration is harmful to marriage 
It may not be clear at the outset why the disintegration of a couple’s relationship is harmful to 
marriage and thus why spousal friendship should even be sought as a preventative measure 
against such disintegration.  The Christian tradition presents marriage as a covenantal bond and 
not a merely contractual one.  The distinction between these words is significant.  A contractual 
relationship is one which may involve the mutual use of the parties contracting the relationship 
for some benefit to each.  But when marriage is placed in the context of a covenantal bond, it 
means the establishment of “a partnership of the whole life… ordered toward the good of the 
spouses and the procreation and education of offspring; this covenant between baptized persons 
has been raised by Christ the Lord to the dignity of a sacrament.”46 
A merely contractual relationship might be incurred by persons of a relationship based 
upon romantic passion—as described in the previous chapter—wherein it would seemingly not 
be harmful for the parties who mutually consent to remain on such a level, do so.  When the 
utility or passion of the relationship dies—when either party no longer receives from the other 
what he literally bargained for from the other—each is free to part ways and the relationship 
disintegrates.  Yet, as a covenantal relationship, marriage must endure beyond the flight of one’s 
                                                          
46 Catholic Church, 1601 
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subjective pleasurability or utility—which may very well have caused the initial attraction of the 
spouses.  Their relationship must be based upon some kind of relationship that endures beyond 
the experience of use or pleasure or emotion, for, when these fade the spousal bond yet endures. 
 
Summary 
Romantic passion, insofar as it originates in the sensual experience of the individuals and is—of 
itself—ordered as a good to the experience of pleasure of those individuals, is an insufficient 
basis for the establishment of the spousal relationship.  Taken of its own accord, it seeks a good 
for itself that does not recognize the person any more than as the object through which the 
passion is roused and the good it seeks is attained for itself.  This does not, however, exclude the 
possibility that romantic passion be present in the spousal relationship that is based upon some 
other kind of relationship. 
Therefore, since romantic passion focuses on self-gratification, the kinds of attraction, the 
forms of loves and relationships arising from those loves are—of themselves—insufficient 
grounds upon which to base a spousal relationship.  It must be reiterated, however, that while 
these things are not alone expedient for the spousal relationship, they are nevertheless not to be 
considered incompatible with it.  On the contrary, a healthy spousal relationship should consist 
of elements of all of the abovementioned facets.  However, the way about which this is possible 
shall be taken up in the next chapter of this essay. 
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Chapter II:  
Why and how spousal friendship is necessary  
to prevent disintegration. 
 
The first chapter of this essay explored the nature of romantic passion and why a relationship 
based upon it alone cannot sustain the spousal relationship.  The present chapter will explore 
why and how spousal friendship is needed to prevent disintegration.  But first, it will be 
important to have a sense of what we mean by friendship and how we came to this 
understanding. 
 
What is friendship? (A Historical Overview) 
How to understand what we experience in friendship has been articulated and then developed 
over centuries.  To explore every person who has ever written on the subject would be an 
impossible feat to attempt in this essay.  Yet certain key figures ought to be mentioned whose 
contributions to understanding the nature of friendship have deeply impacted thought on the 
subject even until today.  There is also, of course, a [literally] cosmic event which occurred and 
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necessarily left its imprint upon the discussion—altogether deepening it: the Incarnation and 
revelation of Jesus Christ.   
Saint Augustine’s contribution is key because he is one of the most influential Christian 
authors to explore the nature of friendship in the early centuries of the Church’s history and was 
enormously influential to the Church’s later tradition on the subject.  Aristotle and Cicero were 
major influences on him.  Saint Thomas Aquinas—the ultimate synthesizer of the Christian 
theological tradition—relies heavily upon Augustine’s synthesis of theology and his integration 
of the philosophical themes of friendship (especially Aristotle and Cicero).  Therefore, in 
presenting a concise historical overview, it is crucial to highlight some of the major contributions 
of each of these figures; yet this brief historical presentation of what friendship (in general) is 
will focus mainly upon the contributions of Augustine. 
Use of the term ‘friendship’ was not very common in the earliest days of the Church’s 
antiquity.  The 4th century, however, saw a leap in the use of ‘friendship’ where the foundation 
for discussion of the subject is rooted in much (though not all) of the pagan philosophical and 
literary writings pertaining to the subject.  Apart from merely Christianizing the pagan concept 
of friendship, it should be noted that the advent of an imperially recognized Christian Church 
sprung a new interest in the subject as Church membership quickly spread across the known 
world.47 
The concept of Christian friendship, or what the Patristic Fathers called “spiritual 
friendship” derives out of the pagan notion of friendship to one that is oriented toward God 
                                                          
47 Carolinne White. Christian Friendship in the Fourth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 4. 
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through the exercise of virtue.48  The virtue of chastity, for example, may be cultivated by an 
individual either with the support of another to hold him accountable or else by the 
encouragements he receives from his trusted friend.   
Vittorino Grossi states that “Augustine brought the understanding of friendship to the 
anthropological level of human existence as such.”49  By placing friendship on the level of 
anthropology, Augustine deemed that friendship plays an essential role in human flourishing.50  
“He included it in the list of common goods, like freedom, etc., that is, among the inalienable 
goods of human existence.  Man, unable to live human life as a friend, deprived of reciprocal 
communication with his fellow creatures, would not live in a communion worthy of human 
beings but in the slavery of those who pursue illusions… Every human being must therefore be 
taught how to form friendships and be enabled to enjoy them.  A human creature that is deprived 
of this good could not live his life at the human level, which presupposes reciprocal 
communication.”51   
 
Aristotle’s Ethics 
Aristotle lived during the fourth century BC (384-322BC).  His contribution to understanding the 
nature of friendship in the Nichomachean Ethics has been foundational to many who followed 
after him (not only to Augustine, but also to Cicero and eventually Saint Thomas Aquinas and 
                                                          
48 David Bohr, Revised Catholic Moral Tradition (Indiana: Our Sunday Visitor, Inc., 1999) 272.  
49 Vittorino Grossi. “Sexuality and friendship in early Christianity.” L’Osservatore Romano (April 9, 1997) 10. 
50 Aristotle and Cicero would have agreed that friendship was crucial to human flourishing, but they did not have the 
revelation of Jesus Christ, and certainly had not foreseen the depth of intimacy mediated by the divine to the human.   
51 Grossi, 10 
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others as well).  Much of what will appear in the following pages of this essay are the 
foundational aspects of friendship that are articulated by Aristotle.  Yet, a few key elements can 
here be expressed.   
Aristotle argued that for authentic friendship to be present, each party must genuinely 
will the good of the other for the other’s own sake and their reciprocated goodwill must be 
mutually known.52  The pursuit of a common good binds each friend to the other; the quality of 
that shared good affects the quality their friendship.53  The good pursued in spousal friendship 
might be the flourishing or virtuous living of each spouse.54  Therefore, the first key element to 
illuminate from Aristotle’s work on friendship is his emphasis of the common aim of virtue 
between friends.  Yet, only good people can truly be friends to one another.55  Virtuous people 
are capable of desiring the good of the other for the other’s own sake, while base people “find no 
                                                          
52 Aristotle, 1155b, 1156a 
53 cf. Paul, J. Wadell, C.P. Friends of God: Virtues and Gifts in Aquinas. (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 
1991) 3-4. 
54 The enduring nature of virtue and its role in sustaining friendship is a departure from earlier perspectives of 
friendship.  Love was certainly a subject of Plato’s Symposium, but, as Kerr points out, in this dialogue, “it is 
assumed that the desire to possess and control is characteristic of all love – which, in any case, is of only one kind.  
Jealousy, anger at one’s vulnerability, fear of instability, and so on, could be defeated only by submitting to the 
discipline of training one’s love exclusively upon objects less fickle, unreliable, and imperfect, than human beings.  
Over against all that, Aristotle reminds us that there is a kind of love that really respects and enhances the separate 
good of the other person.  It is a love that includes other kinds of love, which arise on more limited and unstable 
grounds.”  Fergus Kerr, “Charity as Friendship.” Language, Meaning and God. (London: Cassell Publishers Limited 
(1987)): 17. 
55 Vicious people do not form stable relationships.  Yet they may indulge in a relationship with another vicious 
person for a time – even possibly taking delight in the sharing of vice and vicious actions – but their relationship is 
unstable and will not endure in this manner.  What might endure a little longer: if they form a friendship of utility or 
pleasure before their association in vice is terminated.  Such persons will likely tend toward a relationship of utility 
– aimed at getting something that is lacking and returning something else – but even this relationship will not endure 
beyond its usefulness (cf. Aristotle, 1159b). 
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enjoyment in one another if they get no benefit.”56  While a virtuous person can “be a friend” to a 
base person,57 it would seem that a base person cannot reciprocate the extension of goodwill 
since he is incapable of genuinely willing the good of another for his own sake. 
Reciprocity is a requisite feature of friendship for Aristotle.  For this reason, soulless 
things cannot be friends.58  “To a friend… you must wish goods for his own sake.  If you wish 
good things in this way, but the same wish is not returned by the other, you would be said to 
have [only] goodwill for the other.  For friendship is said to be reciprocated goodwill.”59  But 
this reciprocated goodwill must also be known by both parties to be friendship.60  Thus the 
requisites of friendship for Aristotle are: that (1) the individual must genuinely will the good of 
the other for the other’s own sake; (2) the other party must reciprocate that willing of the good of 
the other for his own sake; (3) the reciprocated goodwill of each party must be known by the 
other.61  Much more could be said of Aristotle’s corpus on friendship—and several other things 
will be—however, for now it will suffice to move on to Cicero and show how Augustine 
modified some of Cicero’s ideas about friendship. 
 
 
                                                          
56  Aristotle, 1157a 
57 This is to say that the virtuous person can extend the love of the other for the other’s own sake to such a person. 
58 cf. Aristotle, 1155b 
59 Aristotle, 1155b 
60 cf. Aristotle, 1156a 
61 This third point entails that there be some degree of healthy communication existing between friends.  Fr. Stephen 
F. Brett summed up the essential characteristics of friendship in Aristotle in a slightly different way as: “(1) a mutual 
attraction by two subjects to a common good, (2) a desire for good to the friend, (3) an awareness of the other’s 
benevolence and reciprocity of this good will, (4) some regular communication of this good will in light of the 
overarching good that began and continues to ground their friendship” (Brett, 18). 
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Augustine builds upon Cicero 
Keeping in mind that Aristotle was a predecessor of Cicero, Cicero’s work can, in a sense, be 
seen to build and develop from the Aristotelian corpus.  Cicero was a Roman philosopher who 
lived around the first century before Christ (106-43BC).  Saint Augustine’s own understanding of 
the nature of friendship, as was mentioned above, draws heavily from the perspectives of both 
Aristotle and Cicero.62  To Cicero, “friendship is, ‘an agreement on all things human and divine 
with goodwill and love’ (Cicero Laelius 6.20)… ‘so that many should, as it were, become one 
soul’ (Cicero Laelius 25.92).”63  But to this definition Augustine “adds that the source of 
friendship is God’s grace (Confessions 4.4.7); that the unity of the body of Christ provides the 
solidest base for friendship… and love of God in one’s friend is the best way to love him 
properly (Confessions 4.9.14).”64  Marie Aquinas McNamara paraphrases Augustine’s definition 
of friendship from the Soliloquies wherein Augustine emphasizes the active element of 
friendship: “it is a sympathy for one who is aspiring toward God, something which continues and 
helps him to grow in love of God.”65 
 Using the classical notion of friendship as his point of departure, Augustine constructs a 
fundamentally Christian concept of friendship which will be capable of extending even beyond 
                                                          
62 It seems that Cicero himself often uses the term amicitia in the sense of the Greek philia.  The broad range of 
meaning which this affiliation incorporates will span relationships “of material, physical, psychological and 
sociological expediency as well as the closest of interpersonal relationships within the family unit.”  John F. 
Monagle. “Friendship in St. Augustine’s Biography: Classical notion of Friendship.” Augustinian Studies (1971) 93. 
63 Carol Harrison. Augustine: Christian Truth and Fractured Humanity. (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 
2000) 162. 
64 Harrison, 162 
65 Marie Aquinas McNamara. Friendship in Saint Augustine. (Fribourg: University Press, 1958). 199; cf. Augustine, 
Soliloquies, 7, 20, 22; This subject will be explored in greater depth in the third chapter of this essay. 
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time and into perpetuity.66  To this end, McNamara finds “four fundamental points which 
distinguish [Augustine’s notion of Christian friendship] from friendship according to the pagan 
ethos:”67  These are: (1) “God is the author and giver of friendship;”68 (2) “Friendship must be 
stabilized in Him;”69  (3) “Christian friendship is transfigured by grace.  It surpasses the noble 
pagan ideal of Cicero where friends wish for each other the highest degree of natural virtue 
possible in this life; friends united by its bonds wish for each other a supernaturally virtuous life 
here and eternal happiness with God in heaven;”70 (4) “Friendship will attain its perfection only 
in heaven.”71 
It is inadequate to say that a kind of equality is required for friendship in Augustine’s 
thought.  Augustine believes that real friendship is only present when it is lived in imitation of 
Christ, who loved us onto death.  Yet, in commenting on John 15:13,72 Augustine writes that “the 
martyr of Christ is far inferior to Christ.”73  Nevertheless, the martyrs receive the Lord in the 
Eucharist and follow in His witness by giving of themselves “for the sake of their brethren.”74  
Augustine elaborates on the infinite divide between Christ and those who seek to imitate Him in 
friendship; he calls any man who would dare to claim equality with Christ a man living a “life of 
                                                          
66 McNamara, 196 
67 McNamara, 196 
68 McNamara, 196 
69 McNamara, 196 
70 McNamara, 197 
71 McNamara, 197 
72 “Greater love has no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends” (John 15:13, RSV). 
73 Augustine, Tractate 84, 135 
74 Augustine, Tractate 84, 135 
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deceit.”75  The inequality existing between Jesus Christ and the individual human being is not the 
result of any lack in Jesus’ own humanity; it is the inestimable disparity between His virtue and 
our own.  So to what, if not equality, can we point as the facilitating medium of friendship in 
Augustine’s mind?  Charity itself is this medium; through charity our souls are elevated so that 
we share in the very life of God.  It was through the exercise of charity that Christ conquered sin 
and death.76  Now we are to “love one another as Christ both loved us and handed himself over 
for us.”77   
Augustine brings together the Greek notion of philia, Cicero’s use of amicitia 
(friendship), and his own meditations on Scripture to arrive at his distinctively Christian version 
of friendship—which is higher than anything that the pagan philosophers had hitherto 
imagined.78  Augustine elevates the meaning of the term amicitia from Greek notion of philia by 
employing it to speak even of this distinctively Christian form of friendship.  This new, higher, 
and distinctively Christian form of friendship is characterized precisely by the exercise of 
fraternal charity.79 
 
 
                                                          
75 Augustine, Tractate 84, 135; cf. Proverbs 23:3  
76 While still using the term amicitia, the signification given in such contexts takes the meaning of this term beyond 
that intended in the Greek sense of the term philia; Augustine employs amicitia precisely to signify Christian 
fraternal charity which is exercised by each party of the friendship (Monagle, 83).  Yet, even this notion of 
friendship is not the highest form as can be manifested; the highest form of friendship will be experienced in heaven 
between us and the angels: amicitia sanctorum (cf. City of God, 19:9) and at last with Christ Himself: amicitiam 
Christi (Monagle, 83). 
77 Augustine, Tractate 84, 136 
78 Monagle, 92 
79 Monagle, 92 
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Friendship in Saint Augustine 
Friendship plays a crucial role in safeguarding and advancing healthy human relationships; 
perhaps this is why Saint Augustine (354-430AD) wrote so frequently about it.  While no single 
treatise on the subject was composed by him, there are many contexts in which he brings in the 
subject of friendship when writing about other matters.80  Those contexts themselves can be 
telling about how Augustine understood friendship’s role in preventing the disintegration of 
human relationships.  Some significant references can be found in his writings that specifically 
address spousal friendship and its role in sustaining the context for the expression of spousal 
love.   
One such reference comes from his short treatise, On Faith in Things Unseen.  In this 
treatise, Augustine defends Christian Faith—as a thing that is unseen—by demonstrating that the 
goodwill of friendship is real—though it is a thing unseen.81  Faith is placed in a friend even 
though his fidelity cannot be visibly manifest except what may be said to be manifest through his 
deeds.82  Then, in the fourth paragraph of the treatise, Augustine claims that friendship is so very 
fundamental to human relationship that, without it, all other human relationships will 
disintegrate.  He writes that: 
 
                                                          
80 Augustine uses the term amicitia in a broad spectrum of relational contexts: relationships between worldly people, 
relationships of fraternal charity between Christians, relationships with the angels, and even the relationship with 
God which elevates us to participation in His very life (cf. Marie Aquinas McNamara. Friendship in Saint 
Augustine. (Fribourg: University Press, 1958) 194-195).  Since Augustine used the term amicitia in all of these 
contexts, it is precisely through the context in which the term appears that we must determine whether the use of the 
term is made in reference to specifically Christian friendship (cf. McNamara, 195). 
81 cf. Augustine.  On Faith in Things Unseen.  (Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight). 
<http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1305.htm>. §2 
82 Augustine.  On Faith in Things Unseen. §2-3 
28 
 
Friendship perishing, there will be preserved in the mind the bonds neither of marriages, nor 
of kindreds and relations; because in these also there is assuredly a friendly union of 
sentiment. Spouse therefore will not be able to love spouse in turn, inasmuch as each believes not 
the other's love, because the love itself cannot be seen.83 
 
The tendency of relationships merely of romantic passion toward disintegration was discussed in 
the previous chapter of this essay.  In this citation from Augustine’s treatise it is clear that he 
thinks friendship is necessary—not only for sustaining the bond of marriage in the spousal 
relationship—but even for sustaining any intimate relation between “kindreds and relations” as 
well.  Without the love characteristic of friendship, the spousal relationship tends toward a 
harmful disintegration by the reduction of the spouses to mere objects of use through the pursuit 
of self-gratification (as was discussed in the previous chapter of this essay).  Augustine believed, 
furthermore, that the very “essence of the institution of marriage is a unique kind of loving 
friendship.”84  His book, On the Good of Marriage,85 begins:  
Every individual belongs to the human race, and by virtue of his humanity he is a social being.  In 
addition, he possesses the great and natural blessing of a capacity for friendship.  It was with 
these purposes that God decided to create all humanity from one man, so that all would be kept in 
community with each other not only by similarity of species but also by the bond of kinship.  
Hence the first natural link in human society is that between man and wife.  Even these God did 
not create as separate individuals and then unite them as strangers by birth, but he fashioned the 
wife from the husband, and signaled the strength of their union by the flank from which she was 
drawn and formed; for those who walk together, and together observe the direction which they 
are taking, are joined side by side in unity.  The next link in the chain of community is children, 
the sole worthy outcome not of the union between male and female, but of sexual intercourse; for 
even without such sexual association there could exist a true union of friendship between the two 
sexes, with the one governing and the other obeying.86   
 
                                                          
83 Augustine.  On Faith in Things Unseen. §4 
84 Perry Cahall. “The Proper Order of Conjugal Love: The Relevance of St. Augustine’s Insights,” Logos, (Winter 
2005): 123. 
85 De Bono Coniugali 
86 Augustine. De Bono Coniugali, De Sancta Virginitate. (Translated by P. G. Walsh. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2001). 3 
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Augustine argues that marriage existed as a special bond from the very creation of the human 
race.87  But in starting his book On the Good of Marriage by invoking the social nature of human 
beings, he immediately set the genesis of the spousal relationship within a discussion of 
friendship between persons.  Quite in opposition to a relationship wherein two individuals are 
joined who seek goods merely for themselves through the other person (bodily, emotionally, or 
in some other way), marriage requires a relationship in which the individual good of the other is 
sought by each person.88  Now, this idea of friendship existing in marriage is not wholly an 
innovation of Augustine; in his Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle saw the possibility of an 
authentic relationship of friendship existing between a husband and wife.89  Augustine’s 
fundamental presentation of the nature of friendship—and that of the rest of the Christian 
tradition—relies heavily upon the nature of friendship as it is presented by these early 
philosophers.   
 
Friendship in Aquinas 
Likewise, Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274AD) relies heavily upon both Augustine and 
Aristotle throughout much of his own theological undertakings; the subject of friendship is no 
                                                          
87 cf. Genesis 2:21-25 
88 Fr. Stephen F. Brett sums up Augustine’s understanding of friendship as “a union of one soul with two bodies” 
(Brett, 17). 
89 cf. Aristotle, 1161a24, 1162a17-35.  Yet, this point is sometimes missed in discussing the contributions of 
Augustine.  For instance, in the 3rd footnote of his translation of Augustine’s De Bono Coniugali, P.G. Walsh writes 
that: “in Plato’s Lysis, in the two books on friendship in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, and in Cicero’s De 
amicitia, friendship is envisaged wholly in terms of the relationship between men, considered on a higher plane than 
that between man and wife… Augustine seems here concerned to endow Christian marriage with a dignity higher 
than the institution had enjoyed earlier” (Augustine, De Bono Coniugali, 2). 
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exception.  He builds upon Augustine’s affiliation of charity with friendship.90  In the Summa 
Theologica, Aquinas goes so far as to define charity as a kind of friendship.91  Aquinas writes 
that “not every love has the character of friendship, but that love which is together with 
benevolence, when, to wit, we love someone so as to wish good to him.  If, however, we do not 
wish good to what we love, but wish its good for ourselves, (thus we are said to love wine, or a 
horse, or the like) it is love not of friendship, but of a kind of concupiscence.”92  Charity in 
Aquinas’ mind is essentially “the friendship of human beings for God.”93  In this regard at least, 
                                                          
90 It should be duly noted that Aquinas rarely ever wrote of the nature of charity in his career as a theologian.  One 
of these occasions—found in his Summa Theologica—marked a change in his understanding of the nature of charity 
to be characterized by friendship which Kerr believe resulted from Aquinas re-reading Aristotle’s Ethics (cf. Kerr, 
3).   
Mark Huberty suggests that the change in Aquinas’s perspective might just as easily be explained by the 
contextual difference in his discussions of charity—that is, when Aquinas wrote his Summa, he was no longer 
working “within the framework and terminology of Lombard; he is treating man as created by God, but not 
necessarily within a Christological context” (Mark A. Huberty. “Friendship with God: The Model of Caritas in St. 
Thomas Aquinas.” Master of Arts in Theology Thesis. (Saint Paul Seminary School of Divinity: Saint Paul, MN, 
1996): 22-23).   
91 Aquinas, Summa Theologica Ia IIae Q. 26 A. 4.  Also, in Disputed Questions on the Virtues Aquinas says that 
charity is prior to friendship.  He writes: “Friendship is not held to be a virtue, but the result of a virtue.  The reason 
is that when people possess virtue and love the good of reason, as a result, by virtue’s own inclination, they love 
those who are like them, i.e. other virtuous people, in whom the good of reason flourishes.  But friendship towards 
God, insofar as God is blessed and the cause of blessedness, need to precede those virtues that order us to 
blessedness.  That is why, since it does not follow, but comes before, other virtues, as I have shown, it needs to be a 
virtue in itself” (Thomas Aquinas.  Disputed Questions on the Virtues.  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005): 120 (“On Charity” A. 2, R. 8)).   
92 Aquinas, Summa Theologica IIa IIae Q. 24 Art. 1; Notably, Aquinas names the love of friendship “benevolence.”  
Yet, the significance of this benevolence and Aquinas’ definition of charity as friendship with God will not be 
examined until the following chapter of this essay.  
93 Donald X. Burt Augustine’s World: An Introduction to His Speculative Philosophy (Maryland: University Press of 
America Inc., 1996) 679.  In defining charity in terms of friendship, Aquinas proposes three characteristics of 
charity—borrowed from Aristotle—through which we can better understand what charity is.  These are: 
“benevolence, mutuality, and community of life” (Huberty, 24).  By benevolence, the other’s good is being willed 
by his friend while respecting the autonomy of that other.  The friend is loved for himself and “the active seeking of 
[his] good is the sustaining project of the lover’s life” (Paul J. Wadell, Friendship and the Moral Life. (Notre Dame: 
Notre Dame Press, 1989): 131-132).  This reference is also cited in Huberty, 25.  Mutuality is about reciprocation—
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Aquinas departs from Aristotle—who believed that such friendship with the divine was 
impossible due to the profound inequality between the divine and human.94   
Aquinas divides the discussion of love into two species: concupiscence and benevolence.  
Only one of these is an expression of the love that respects the dignity of another person as a 
person.95  The love of concupiscence is the love by which we love something for the sake of 
something else.  Aquinas himself provides two examples: wine and horses.  Wine I might drink 
both for the sake of pleasure and sustenance.  The horse I might ride or hitch up to a cart to carry 
some goods or people to a given destination.  In either case, the object of being loved with the 
love of concupiscence is loved, not in its self, but for the sake of something else.  On the other 
hand, the love of benevolence is the love through which the individual can experience friendship.  
Yet, benevolent love does not necessarily lead to friendship.  For friendship to exist, the 
benevolent love must be reciprocated by both parties and recognized by both as reciprocated.  
But when all are three conditions are present, the friendship experienced through the love of 
benevolence can take the form of the noble (friendship proper), the useful, or the pleasant.96  
Within the context of noble friendship the other becomes the object being loved in itself and not 
for the sake of something else; this is the only way by which another human being can be loved 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the love extended in friendship is extended by each to the other (Huberty, 27).  Finally, community of life entails 
that something is communicated between the friends; in the case of friendship with God, that which is 
communicated is beatitude (Huberty, 27-28). 
94 Burt, 679 
95 In his discussion on the virtue of charity in Disputed Questions on the Virtues, Aquinas writes that “to love for the 
purpose of possessing it or owning it that good in which the blessed share does not put someone in the right state for 
blessedness; indeed even the wicked covet this this good.  However, to love it in itself, wanting it to remain and 
spread, and wanting nothing to act against it, does put someone in the right state for the society of the blessed” 
(Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Virtues, 119 (“On Charity” A. 2)). 
96 These three loves of friendship are explained in Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics; they were examined in greater 
detail in the first section of this essay.   
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adequately.97  Spousal friendships, as well as non-spousal friendships, are to be found within the 
genus of noble friendship.   
Engaging the Aristotelian terminology discussed in the first chapter of this essay, 
Aquinas affirms that a kind of genuine friendship can still exist in relationships of mere utility or 
pleasure.  Yet to remain genuine expressions of friendship the utility or pleasure must be willed 
to the other for the other’s sake and not for one’s own benefit.98  Pleasure and utility as 
expressions of friendship are of a lower order to the nature of noble (the truest) friendship.99  The 
                                                          
97 In the Disputed Questions on the Virtues, Aquinas says that “since the object of love understood generally is the 
good understood as something in common, it is necessary for there to be a particular good as the object of any 
particular love.  For example, the distinctive object of natural friendship we have for our family is such natural good 
as we derive from our parents.  For political friendships, on the other hand, the object is the good of the community.  
In this way, charity too has its own particular good as its distinct object, that is, the good of divine blessedness, as I 
said above.  How things are to be loved by charity is determined by the way that they relate to this good” (Aquinas, 
Disputed Questions on the Virtues, 147-148 (“On Charity” A. 7)). 
 Aquinas goes on to say that “when we talk of loving, which is wishing good for someone, something can be 
loved in two ways: (i) as the thing for which we want the good; or (ii) as the good which we want for someone.  In 
the first sense (i), things can only be loved from charity if we want the good of eternal life for them.  These can only 
be things that are by nature apt to possess the good of eternal blessedness.  That is why, since only intelligent natures 
are by nature apt to possess the good of eternal blessedness, only an intelligent nature can be loved by charity, in the 
first sense of loving” (Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Virtues, 148 (“On Charity” A. 7)).   
 Further on he describes the second sense: “(ii), i.e. when we say that we ‘love’ the good things that we want 
for others, we can love any good out of charity insofar as it is a good for someone who is capable of possessing 
blessedness.  For all creatures are there for human beings on their journey, to incline them towards blessedness.  
Again, all creatures are ordered towards the glory of God insofar as divine goodness is displayed in them.  In this 
way, we are able to love everything out of charity if we order it towards things that either possess blessedness or 
could do so” (Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Virtues, 148 (“On Charity” A. 7)).  Charity, he explains, 
incorporates all kinds of human loves except those that are based upon sin; thus, the mutual love of family members, 
fellow-citizens, etc. can be meritorious (cf. Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Virtues, 149 (“On Charity” A. 7)). 
98 That is to say, to be an expression of friendship, one must love the other with the love of benevolence; the love by 
which a person wills these goods cannot dissolve into a love of concupiscence if it is to be called a genuine 
friendship.   
99 “When friendship is based on usefulness or pleasure, a man does indeed wish his friend some good: and in this 
respect the character of friendship is preserved.  But since he refers this good further to his own pleasure or use, the 
result is that friendship of the useful or pleasant, in so far as it is connected with love of concupiscence, loses the 
character of true friendship.” Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia IIae Q. 26 A. 4. 
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friendship arising from a relationship of utility or pleasure is an expression of the love of 
concupiscence whereby a means is loved by which some good is attained for myself or another; 
meanwhile, the love of friendship is expressed in the higher form of true friendship whereby the 
person is loved as an end in himself.100 
 
Spousal Friendship 
Spousal friendship is a unique form of friendship existing between a man and a woman who are 
bound in relationship with one another through marriage.  Saint Augustine proposes that there 
are three goods in marriage: Proles101 (the procreation and education of children), Fides102 (the 
                                                          
100 Keaty expresses this idea in slightly different terms; he writes: “love of friendship refers to the love that a person 
has for the friend.  Love of concupiscence refers to the love that a person has for the good that is wished to the 
friend” (Keaty, 588). 
101 Donald Burt says that, “Although procreation was the primary reason for the creation of the family, the essential 
element in the family is something else entirely.  In Augustine’s view marriage is constituted by a commitment 
between husband and wife where each gives oneself to the other in a spiritual bond expressed through friendship.  
Augustine’s position makes good sense.  Certainly no one would say that a man and woman are married because 
they share a physical intercourse.  A true family is formed not by a passing physical encounter but by a permanent 
spiritual union of hearts.  This conviction led Augustine to insist that a marriage can exist even when the union is 
infertile by reason of age, illness, or a free mutual decision of the partners to remain continent for good reasons.  A 
marriage can exist without children and does not exist where there is no union of hearts” (Burt, 83).  Several of the 
claims made here by Burt are seemingly confirmed by Augustine in the third chapter of his De Bono Coniugali 
(Augustine, De Bono Coniugali, 7).   
102 Fidelity refers to more than the physical or sexual monogamy of the spouses.  As Lisa Fullam explains, “it also 
implies a self-sacrificial concern for the partner’s salvation as well” (Fullam, 673).  Augustine uses fides in both the 
narrow sense of sexual exclusivity and the broader sense “to indicate whole-hearted devotion to one’s spouse… that 
hews closer to the framing metaphor of friendship with which Augustine begins his treatise on marriage” (Fullam, 
675).  In his book Friendship and Society, Donald Burt adds that “Even though he usually puts procreation first in 
his list of the goods of marriage, Augustine maintained that the essential characteristic of a valid marriage is that it 
be a union of friends, a friendship solidified by fidelity to one’s spouse (fides) and the permanence of the 
commitment (sacramentum)” (Burt, 83). 
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fidelity of the spouses) and Sacramentum103 (the sacredness and persevering commitment of 
marriage until death).104  These three goods have been upheld throughout the Christian 
tradition.105  However, Augustine also saw the role of the spouses as aids to one another in living 
out the Christian life.  The role of mutual help is not as widely reflected in the Christian tradition 
as are his three goods, but is expressed in spousal friendship.  Saint Thomas Aquinas’ early 
works on marriage106 largely echo Augustine’s three goods.  However, there are also 
developments “in his mature work” wherein he describes friendship as the “form of marriage—it 
makes marriage what it is.  Marriage has three ends, but it is defined as a friendship potentially 
of virtue.”107   
As was stated above, the subject of [specifically] spousal friendship was not much 
discussed in the Christian tradition.  As recently as 1930, however, in his encyclical On Christian 
Marriage (Casti Connubii), Pope Pius XI (1857-1939AD) wrote that the partnership of the whole 
life of the spouses is a “mutual molding of husband and wife… [a] determined effort to perfect 
each other… [which can]… be said to be the chief reason and purpose of matrimony, provided 
matrimony be looked at not in the restricted sense as instituted for the proper conception and 
                                                          
103 Donald Burt explains that the sacred aspect of the marital goods is a reflection of the eternal love of God which 
we will not experience firsthand until we have reached heaven.  He writes that, “Marriage is a sacred sign 
(sacramentum) because the permanent fidelity of the husband and wife reflects the unending love which will exist in 
its fullness only in the heavenly city” (Burt, 85).   
104 Augustine, De Bono Coniugali, 49, 75 
105 The Catechism of the Catholic Church states that: “Unity, indissolubility, and openness to fertility are essential to 
marriage.  Polygamy is incompatible with the unity of marriage; divorce separates what God has joined together; the 
refusal of fertility turns married life away from its ‘supreme gift,’ the child” (Catholic Church, 1664; cf. Gaudium et 
Spes, 50 § 1). 
106 The section of the Summa Theologica that pertains directly to marriage was composed posthumously by his 
students, drawn largely from his earlier writings and notes on the subject of marriage. 
107 Fullam, 665 
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education of the child, but more widely as the blending of life as a whole and the mutual 
interchange and sharing thereof.”108  Pius XI makes a bold claim, that what is here understood to 
be an expression of spousal friendship is considered the chief reason and purpose of matrimony. 
In discussing the ends of marriage, the Catechism of the Catholic Church quotes 
Familiaris Consortio, 13: 
Conjugal love involves a totality, in which all the elements of the person enter – appeal of the 
body and instinct, power of feeling and affectivity, aspiration of the spirit and of will.  It aims at a 
deeply personal unity, a unity that, beyond union in one flesh, leads to forming one heart and 
soul; it demands indissolubility and faithfulness in definitive mutual giving; and it is open to 
fertility.  In a word it is a question of the normal characteristics of all natural conjugal love, but 
with a new significance which not only purifies and strengthens them, but raises them to the 
extent of making them the expression of specifically Christian values.109 
 
Conjugal love is ordered to a deeply personal unity that leads to the formation of one heart and 
soul.  By its nature, friendship moves the two into a deeper union—toward a depth of intimacy in 
which each is free to express love in vulnerability as is needed in the exchange of deeply 
personal love.  Spousal friendship can therefore facilitate the personal unity that is characteristic 
of conjugal love.  The role of spousal friendship is a significant theme in Saint John Paul II’s 
book Love and Responsibility, which builds upon the earlier tradition of friendship that has been 
examined in this essay.  Of the nature of friendship, he writes: 
In friendship—and here it is unlike mere sympathy—the decisive part is played by the will.  I 
desire a good for you just as I desire it for myself, for my own ‘I’.  The content and structure of 
friendship can be summed up in this formula.  It brings out the element of benevolentia or 
goodwill, (‘I want what is good for you’), and also the characteristic of ‘doubling’ of the subject, 
the doubling of the ‘I’: my ‘I’ and your ‘I’ form a moral unity, for the will is equally well inclined 
to both of them, so that ipso facto your ‘I’ necessarily becomes in some sense mine, lives within 
my ‘I’ as well as within itself.  This is the meaning of the word ‘friendship’.  The doubling of the 
‘I’ implicit in it emphasizes the unification of persons which friendship brings with it.110 
                                                          
108 Pius XI, 24 
109 Catholic Church, 1643 
110 Wojtyla, 90-91 
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John Paul II argues that the meaning of friendship is the moral unity of the two ‘I’s through the 
mutual extension of benevolence.  It is crucial to note that the two ‘I’s remain distinct, though 
united.  Unity of the two is the coming together of two distinct wills to mutuality whereby both 
wills will equally to either person the goods that are proper to both persons.  In this way the 
doubling of the ‘I’ unifies both persons to one another without either compromising his own 
subjective good or distinctiveness.111   
 
Spousal friendship prevents disintegration 
The reduction of another person to being merely an object of one’s use is harmful to that person.  
It is certainly contrary to willing the other’s good.  To use another person as an object instead of 
an end is to reduce the dignity of that person to something less than that person deserves by 
virtue of his humanity.112  By virtue of their dignity, persons deserve to be loved as ends in 
themselves and not merely used as means to other ends.113   
                                                          
111 Speaking of Saint Thomas Aquinas’s perspective on the equality of women to men, Dr. Mary Lemmons writes: 
“Sexual equality makes friendship possible between men and women.  Aquinas accordingly declares: ‘Now, there 
seems to be the greatest friendship between husbands and wives’ ([Summa Contra Gentiles] III, c. 123).  In this 
respect, he follows Aristotle: ‘Between man and wife, friendship seems to exist by nature’ ([Nicomachean Ethics] 
Bk. 8, ch. 12, 1162a 16).”  Mary Hayden Lemmons. Ultimate Normative Foundations: The Case for Aquinas’s 
Personalist Natural Law. (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2011): 378. 
112 In an essay from the President’s Council on Bioethics entitled Human Dignity and Bioethics, authors Patrick Lee 
and Robert P. George describe the dynamic nature of human dignity by explaining it in terms of what is meant 
objectively—as applies to all people—and also in terms of one’s subjective assimilation of dignity.  With respect to 
the objective dignity experienced by all, they write: “These basic, natural capacities to reason and make free choices 
are possessed by every human being, even those who cannot immediately exercise them.  One’s existence as a 
person thus derives from the kind of substantial entity one is, a human being—and this is the ground for dignity in 
the most important sense.  Because personhood is based on the kind of being one is—one cannot lose one’s 
fundamental personal dignity as long as one exists as a human being.”  Patrick Lee and Robert P. George, “The 
Nature and Basis of Human Dignity.” Human Dignity and Bioethics. (Accessed December 15, 2014. 
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Spousal friendship safeguards the person by loving the other as another self 
Spousal friendship prevents disintegration by willing the good of the other for the other’s own 
sake.  Love of the other for the other’s own sake is the ideal form of friendship presented in 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.114  Aristotle calls this form of friendship “complete friendship” 
[or the friendship of comrades] which is “the friendship of good people similar in virtue; for they 
wish goods in the same way to each other in so far as they are good, and they are good in 
themselves… these people’s friendship lasts as long as they are good; and virtue is enduring.”115  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/pdfpreview/bitstream/handle/10822/559351/human_dignity_and_bioethics
.pdf?sequence=1) 410. 
113 Persons might be used inappropriately as means to ends such as pleasure or utility.  Pope Saint John Paul II 
explains the “objective purposes of marriage create in principle the possibility of love and exclude the possibility of 
treating a person as a means to an end and as an object for use” (Wojtyla, 30). 
114 “Friends for virtue are eager to benefit each other, since this is proper to virtue and to friendship; and if this is the 
achievement they compete for, there are no accusations or fights.  For no one objects if the other loves and benefits 
him; if he is gracious, he retaliates by benefiting the other.” (Aristotle, 1162b). 
115 Aristotle, 1156b.  This kind of loving relationship is the ideal of friendship expressed in his Ethics.  While he 
presents the ideal, Aristotle is not naïve to the difficulties of attaining its authentic expression.  Aristotle warns 
against friendships which are not genuine but merely façades of friendship: “Those who are quick to treat each other 
in friendly ways wish to be friends, but are not friends, unless they are also loveable, and know this.  For though the 
wish for friendship comes quickly, friendship does not” (Aristotle, 1156b).  Just willing to be friends is not 
sufficient.  Friendship cannot be generated simply from the desire to have an intimate relationship with the other 
person, even if he is a man of great virtue.  Like any living thing, friendship needs time to germinate and to mature.  
Their friendship does not suddenly die when friends are temporarily separated from one another.  However, if their 
communication ceases for an extended period of time, their friendship too will fade (cf. Aristotle, 1157b). 
It is also possible to err in one’s perception of the nature of a particular friendship.  Aristotle says that 
“Friends are most at odds when they are not friends in the way they think they are” (Aristotle, 1165b).  This error 
might be either a misperception on the part of the individual or a malicious deception on the part of the other.  “If we 
mistakenly suppose we are loved for our character, when our friend is doing nothing to suggest this, we must hold 
ourselves responsible.  But if we are deceived by his pretense, we are justified in accusing him – even more justified 
than in accusing debasers of the currency, to the extent that his evildoing debases something more precious” 
(Aristotle, 1165b ). 
If a friend becomes bad, Aristotle believed that he should be abandoned only if he is deemed to have 
become incurably vicious (cf. Aristotle, 1165b).  But if the friend has irrevocably succumb to vice, then he should be 
abandoned.  Aristotle explains that friendship is appropriately terminated when friends “come to be separated by 
some wide gap in virtue, vice, wealth, or something else; for then they are friends no more, and do not even expect 
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To love another person for the other person’s own sake is to love that one as you love yourself; 
those who love in this way can be said to love the other literally as another self.116  Yet this also 
presents a limitation; the love with which one loves another is limited by the present stage of 
development of one’s own self-love and by the degree to which one is virtuous.   
If a spouse’s self-love is well ordered, then his ability to love the other will be great 
because the spouse understands what the good is and his desires are aligned towards attaining the 
good.117  If his love is disordered, then that spouse’s capacity for loving the other will be limited 
by the very limitations experienced in his very self.  If one’s self-love is disordered, then that 
individual cannot love the other person as another self because he does not know what it is to 
love self properly.  Much less will that spouse be able to help the other person to grow in virtue if 
he does not possess the virtues personally.  Aristotle saw the importance of the proper ordering 
of self-love and presented the five characteristics of those who have properly ordered self-love.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
to be” (Aristotle, 1158b).  The influence wielded by the incurably vicious person on his onetime friend becomes a 
real danger for the friend who chose to remain a friend of that incurably vicious person.  “We ought neither to love 
what is bad nor to become similar to a bad person” (Aristotle, 1165b); though the temptation will be to do so.  
Furthermore, the love of friendship extended by the virtuous individual in such a case could not be reciprocated 
because of the wide separation in virtue between the two individuals.   
But against the dissolution of the friendship on the grounds of the disparity of virtue and the increase in a 
friend’s vice, Saint Augustine argues that a Christian ought not to abandon a friend to such a state.  If it means that 
the virtuous individual must suffer, then his sufferings are able to be united to the sufferings of Christ.  It is, further, 
because of Christ that the relationships should continue in the uncertain hope of conversion—for Christ does not 
abandon even the most destitute. 
116 It may prove helpful to distinguish the love of self—or of another as another self—from what is sometimes called 
selfish love.  The love of self or love of another as another self are properly ordered loves that recognize the goods 
needed by the self and rightly shun certain things that—while possibly good in themselves—are not goods that 
benefit the individual right now.  Selfish love is driven by passions; it pursues things that may be good in 
themselves, but are either not beneficial to the individual’s flourishing right now or even harmful to the person. 
117 Aquinas writes that “Although one cannot be friends with oneself in the strict sense, one can love oneself.  For, as 
Aristotle says… friendliness to another person comes from friendliness to oneself.  Insofar as charity means love, 
one can certainly love oneself out of charity” (Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Virtues, 150 (“On Charity” A. 7, 
R. 11)). 
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Aristotle’s five features of self-love 
The key factor of growing in a properly ordered love of self is that the individual must grow in 
virtue.  The degree to which each individual of a spousal relationship has attained virtue affects 
the relationship between them (as mentioned above).  Insofar as one spouse’s self-love is 
crippled by vice (disorder), that spouse’s capacity for extending love to the other spouse is 
limited.  Thus it is important to understand first how the self is loved properly so as to learn how 
the other too is properly loved.  Aristotle’s five features of the self-love of the virtuous118 are:   
 
(1) The one who has a properly ordered self-love wills for himself what is good; in his actions, he 
pursues those goods and achieves them.  These goods are willed by such a one for his own sake.   
(2) The one who has a properly ordered self-love desires life for himself and self-preservation as 
goods proper to him.   
(3) The one who has a properly ordered self-love enjoys spending time alone because his actions 
were good such that his conscience is free from the turmoil of disagreeable memories, and he is 
therefore justifiably optimistic for future goods of a similar nature.   
                                                          
118 Similarly, Aristotle lists five corresponding features of vicious persons.  Those people who have attained the 
virtues are appropriately called “virtuous” persons.  The opposite of virtue is vice; therefore, those people who have 
not attained the virtues – but have attained their contrary expressions (vices) – are appropriately called “vicious” 
persons.  Vicious persons have a flawed sense of self-love and are thus limited in their ability to love the other.  For 
this reason, the friend’s mutual role in aiding and facilitating the other’s growth in virtue is essential to the 
flourishing of their relationship – especially in the spousal relationship.  The five features of the self-love of the 
vicious are:  
(1) They do not choose the things that are actually good for them, but instead “choose pleasant things that 
are actually harmful.  And cowardice or laziness causes others to shrink from doing what they think is best for 
themselves.”  (2) “Those who have done many terrible actions hate and shun life because of their vice, and destroy 
themselves.”  (3) “Vicious people seek others to pass their days with, and shun themselves.  For when they are by 
themselves they remember many disagreeable actions, and expect to do others in the future; but they manage to 
forget these in other people’s company.  These people have nothing loveable about them, and so have no friendly 
feelings for themselves.”  (4) “They are at odds with themselves, and, like incontinent people, have an appetite for 
one thing and wish for another.”  (5) “Such a person does not share his own enjoyments and distresses.  For his soul 
is in conflict, and because he is vicious one part is distressed at being restrained, and another is pleased [by the 
intended action]; and so each part pulls in a different direction, as though they were tearing him apart.  Even if he 
cannot be distressed and pleased at the same time, still he is soon distressed because he was pleased, and wishes 
these things had not become pleasant to him; for base people are full of regret” (Aristotle, 1166b). 
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(4) The one who has a properly ordered self-love possesses integrity of intellect, will, passions and 
emotions; he pursues what is truly good.   
(5) The one who has a properly ordered self-love holds no dark secrets since he has done nothing 
about which he ought to be ashamed; but he shares “his own distresses and pleasures, more than 
other people share theirs.”119 
 
These five features of the self-love of the virtuous are applied toward the other as another self in 
friendship.  For spousal friendship to flourish, each spouse will need to have a true sense of self-
love in order that the love extended to the other will be an authentic expression of love and a 
genuine willing of what is truly good.   
The first of these five features is that (1) the individual genuinely desires and pursues 
what is truly good for himself.  While this may seem like an obvious conjecture, it remains the 
case that many persons will pursue things that they acknowledge are unhealthy for themselves 
and their flourishing.120  The second feature is similar to the first; the second feature (2) specifies 
that the goods of life and self-preservation as goods that are pursued as proper to him.  The third 
feature of self-love is that (3) the actions of virtuous individuals are good such that they do not 
incur the guilt of conscience.  The individual therefore experiences a freedom of mind that 
allows him to be at peace with himself even in the absence of others and other activity.  The 
fourth feature (4) entails the proper integration of all human faculties within the individual; his 
intellect and will inform his lower faculties so that the good is pursued and he is not consumed 
                                                          
119 Aristotle, 1166a 
120 E.g. In modern western society, one might think of all of the kinds of unhealthy foods that are irresponsibly 
consumed by consumers who readily acknowledge their unhealthy nature, but continue to consume them anyway 
(these are sometimes called “guilty pleasures” by such persons).  Or else, persons who have developed attachments 
or even addictions to unhealthy drugs or behaviors—acknowledging that they are in their present state—yet not 
ready to move out of their condition.  Similarly, Saint Augustine wrote of his disposition at one stage of his life in 
the form of his heart’s prayer to the Lord: “Grant me chastity and continence, but not yet” (Augustine, Confessions, 
169). 
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by the fleeting impulses of his passions and emotions.  The fifth feature of self-love is most 
similar to the third; (5) in the absence of shameful activity, the virtuous individual is unafraid to 
share intimate details (when appropriate to do so) and is able to do so humbly.   
When an individual is virtuous, he is capable of authentically willing the good of the 
other person.121  The five features of the self-love of the virtuous as they are applied by the 
virtuous to the other in friendship122 are: 
(1) The one who is a friend to others is someone “who wishes and does goods… to his friend for the 
friend’s own sake.” 
(2) The one who is a friend to others wills the good of his friend “to be and to live for the friend’s 
own sake;” this is especially the experience that “friends who have been in conflict feel [towards 
each other].”   
(3) The one who is a friend to another gladly spends his time with his friend.  
(4) The one who is a friend to another makes similar choices as his friend.  
(5) The one who is a friend to another “shares his friend’s distress and enjoyment.”123 
 
As was mentioned above, Aristotle’s five features of self-love are applied to the other in 
friendship of comrades such that the friend literally loves the other as another self.  Virtuous 
persons love themselves and the virtue that they have attained.  In spousal friendship, the self-
love of the spouse both makes possible and facilitates the love of the other for the other’s own 
sake.  It is insofar as the individual has a properly ordered self-love that he is capable to love the 
other properly.  But once capable, it is through experience in one’s self of what the properly 
                                                          
121 It would seem that those persons who are growing in the virtues—but have not yet fully attained them—are still 
able to extend an imperfect expression of this love according to their capacity.  But the authenticity of their love’s 
expression will be limited by their limitations of virtue development. 
122 Therefore, the virtuous person “has each of these features in relation to himself, and is related to his friend as he 
is to himself, since the friend is another himself.  Hence friendship seems to be one of these features, and people 
with these features seem to be friends” (Aristotle, 1166a). 
123 Aristotle, 1166a 
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ordered self is that that individual is able to love those features in another.  Thus we see in these 
five features of the self-love of the virtuous applied to the other the full appreciation of the self 
which is manifested in the wholeness of the person. 
But, in relationships where [at least] one individual is in a state of vice, it is not possible 
for that person to love the other with the love of self—simply because the vicious individual does 
not have a properly ordered love of self from which to be able to love the other as he loves his 
very self.  In such a case, it would seem that the “love” professed by the vicious person to the 
other would be at best a reflection of the distorted inner chaos of displaced erotic 
misinterpretations of what genuine self-love is.124 
                                                          
124 An example of this is made in the Confessions of Augustine.  In book 4 of his Confessions, St. Augustine reveals 
the depth of intimacy he had shared with an unnamed friend.  At the friend’s death, Augustine marveled that “other 
men should live when he was dead, for I had loved him as though he would never die” (Augustine, Confessions, 77).  
He goes on to say “still more I wondered that he should die and I remain alive, for I was his second self… I felt that 
our souls had been as one, living in two bodies, and life to me was fearful because I did not want to live with only 
half a soul” (Augustine, Confessions, 77-78).  In this sense, their relationship became a sort of reversed image of 
Christ’s two natures in one person: “theirs is an inverted Christology, a parody of loss and exaltation;” the two 
friends had become profoundly co-dependent (Richard B. Miller. “Evil, Friendship, and Iconic Realism in 
Augustine’s Confessions.” Harvard Theological Review (October 2011) 394).  This co-dependence, while 
facilitating a radically intimate relationship between them, is not compatible with true friendship in Augustine’s 
mind.   
As an introspective author, Augustine calls the depth of his intimacy with this unnamed friend “madness” 
because he had loved him as more than human; essentially, Augustine seemed to have replaced the place that God 
should have had in his life with his friend (Augustine, Confessions, 78).  Thus, to love a friend too much – with the 
love due only to God – is to not love the friend at all in Augustine’s mind (Miller, 397).   
Augustine had loved this friend “as a private possession rather than as someone whose goodness could be 
shared” (Miller, 398).  What Augustine seems to highlight in the nature of real friendship by this dynamic of his 
story is that for friendship to be authentic, each friend must respect the autonomy of the other.  When his friend 
regained consciousness and became appalled at Augustine’s criticisms of his baptism, Augustine experienced a sort 
of alienation.  Their relationship had been rooted in a sort of fusion of mutual interests until the autonomy of the 
individual’s otherness gave way to codependency.   
Qualities of friendship which are not exclusive to true friendship include being able to: talk together, laugh 
together, and express their intimacy through simple acts of kindness (cf. Augustine, Confessions, 79).  Relationships 
of only romantic passion can even share in serious moments as well as deep/intimate ones.  They can know the other 
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Spousal friendship does not preclude the experiences of pleasure125 
Spouses in such a relationship will experience the goods of both pleasure and utility—they will 
even experience other goods besides—but the foundation of their relationship is more enduring 
than relationships based upon either utility or pleasure.126  Pleasure, for example, is one element 
Aristotle believes must be part of a friendship of virtue.127  He could not imagine such a 
friendship existing where the friends did not enjoy one another’s company.128   
In a friendship of virtue, spouses will foster a desire for each to be in the company of the 
other; it is even possible that, exteriorly, their relationship may even appear to be similar to what 
is manifested by friendship based upon the love of pleasure alone.  Aristotle believes that these 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
intimately enough to understand the unspoken language of the other’s expression.  Yet, to love another for the sake 
of mere companionship is to settle for a single part to the neglect of the whole (cf. Augustine, Confessions, 83).   
125 It does not preclude them, but it offers the proper context for their full expression.  In taking up the question of 
whether all pleasures are evil in the Summa Theologica, Saint Thomas Aquinas also asks whether the physical 
pleasure involved in sexual intercourse itself is morally evil.  He concludes that it is not—that the pleasures 
experienced by the man and woman in this activity are natural—but he reminds us that Original Sin still deeply 
affects the man and woman and can still incline them towards sin (cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologica Ia-IIae Q. 34, A. 
1, R. 1). 
   In an article entitled “Thomas Aquinas on Sexual Pleasure” John Milhaven writes that “Thomas denies 
flatly that sexual pleasure is a moral evil, and even implies that it is morally good.  This is reflected in Thomas’ 
teaching that virtue need not restrain the amount of sexual pleasure the spouse permits himself in intercourse.  Virtue 
lies in keeping the mean; the mean chastity observes lies between the vices of license (luxuria) and insensibility.  
The chaste spouse, therefore, should enjoy the pleasure of intercourse.”  John Giles Milhaven. “Thomas Aquinas on 
Sexual Pleasure.” Journal of Religious Ethics (Fall 1977): 161. 
126 “Each of them is good unconditionally and good for his friend, since good people are both unconditionally good 
and advantageous for each other” (Aristotle, 1156b). 
127 It is typical of friendships based on virtue that they “spend their days together [and] find enjoyment in each 
other” (Aristotle, 1158a). 
128 “Blessedly happy people have no need of anything useful, but do need sources of pleasure.  For they want to 
spend their lives with companions, and though what is painful is borne for a short time, no one could continuously 
endure even The Good Itself if it were painful to him; hence they seek friends who are pleasant.  But, presumably, 
they must also seek friends who are good as well [as pleasant], and good for them too; for then they will have 
everything that friends must have” (Aristotle, 1158a). 
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friendships are rare since people capable of having them are few.129  “Moreover, they need time 
to grow accustomed to each other.”130  Though rare, such friendships experience the full 
spectrum of goods that could be desired in relationships of pleasure alone.  Likewise, spousal 
friendship is capable of incorporating the full spectrum of relational experiences, including what 
is experienced by couples in relationships based merely upon romantic passion.  They do so by 
facilitating the expression of pleasure and utility such that these do not dispose them toward the 
reduction to mere consumption of the other at the impulse of disordered passions, but rather to a 
deep appreciation of the other as good.   
Similar to Aristotle, John Paul II argues that the experience of authentic love should 
integrate all of our emotions.131  The danger against which we must guard ourselves is to reduce 
our apprehension and experience of love to merely the emotional plane.132  “Feelings arise 
spontaneously…” He explains: “the attraction which one person feels towards another often 
begins suddenly and unexpectedly—but this reaction is in effect ‘blind.’”133  Love cannot be 
reduced to the mere consumption of sympathy or pleasure.  Love, rather, “consists in the 
thoroughgoing transformation of sympathy into friendship.”134 
                                                          
129 Additionally, there are many who simply are not inclined toward pursuing friendship.  As Aristotle says, “Older 
people and sour people do not appear to be prone to friendship.  For there is little pleasure to be found in them, and 
no one can spend his days with what is painful or not pleasant, since nature appears to avoid above all what is 
painful and to aim at what is pleasant” (Aristotle, 1157b). 
130 Aristotle, 1156b 
131 cf. Sri, 42; Sri goes on to explain that John Paul II believes that “our emotions are meant to be caught up into our 
commitment to our beloved, thus enriching the relationship and giving us an even deeper experience of union with 
the other person.” Sri, 43; cf. Wojtyla, 75. 
132 Sri, 43 
133 Wojtyla, 77 
134 Wojtyla, 93; John Paul II goes on to say that “Sympathy, in which the subjective shape of love is clearly 
discernible, falls one step short of friendship, in which love first ripens in its objective form. None the less, love 
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How an enduring relationship is fostered through spousal friendship 
Spousal friendship prevents the disintegration of the spousal relationship as was stated above.  
Were it for the sake of disintegration-prevention alone, spousal friendship might be sought out as 
a good since the spousal relationship itself is harmed by disintegration.  However, the spousal 
relationship is also strengthened through spousal friendship into an enduring relationship.  This 
means that it is not only a means of preventing harmful disintegration, but also a medium 
through which the spousal relationship is most beautifully expressed.  The total self-gift 
characteristic of spousal friendship is facilitated through a rightly ordered sense of the value of 
the other person and his complementarity to one’s own self.  Once perceiving the value of the 
other person has become the normative response of each spouse in relation to the other, then the 
natural response of each person—willing the good of the other for his own sake—will be their 
mutual growth in virtue.135   
 
The personalistic norm as a means of spousal friendship 
Saint John Paul II provides a way of understanding the pursuit of the other’s good as an end in 
itself: the personalistic norm.  John Paul II argues (in conjunction with the whole Christian 
Tradition) that there is something special about the encounter of persons.  His personalistic norm 
is the recognition of the dignity and value inherent in every human person.  John Paul II defines 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
itself must be subjective, must reside in two personal subjects, take shape and find expression in them. We must not, 
however, confuse the idea of subjective love with that of subjectivity.  Love is always a subjective thing, in that it 
must reside in subjects, but at the same time it must be free of subjectivity.  It must be something objective within 
the subject, have an objective as well as a subjective profile.  For this reason it cannot be mere sympathy, but must 
first include friendship.” Wojtyla, 93. 
135 A virtue is “a habitual and firm disposition to do the good;” whereas, a vice is “a habit acquired by repeated sin in 
violation of the proper norms of human morality” (Catholic Church, 903). 
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what the personalistic norm is in terms of both a negative formulation and a positive formulation.  
The negative formulation of the personalistic norm “states that the person is the kind of good 
which does not admit of use and cannot be treated as an object of use and as such the means to 
an end.”136  This means that a person should never be used merely as a means to attaining 
another’s good.  The positive formulation of “the personalistic norm confirms this: the person is 
a good towards which the only proper and adequate attitude is love.”137  This positive 
formulation implies that the encounter of persons entails relationship, for to love another entails 
entering into relationship with him.  
The unique encounter of persons—of beings whose dignity reaches beyond any other 
creature in creation—requires a response on the part of the subject to acknowledge and respect 
the dignity that is theirs in virtue of who they are as humans.  This dignity demands that the 
person never be reduced to the status of merely an object of use (according to the negative 
formulation).  The personalistic norm acknowledges the other’s ability to purse ends for himself.  
But it also provides the positive response to the encounter with a person: love.  Thus in 
recognizing the dignity of the other, the personalistic norm safeguards the nature of properly 
ordered relations between persons. 
Applied to the spousal relationship, the personalistic norm ensures that each spouse 
recognizes the other as a person and keeps his personhood on the forefront of any activity or 
choice to be made that affects the relationship between them.  In this way, the spouses safeguard 
one another against the danger of reducing the other to merely a means of self-gratification—to a 
                                                          
136 Wojtyla, 41 
137 Wojtyla, 41 
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mere object of use.  The personalistic norm might be thought of as a tool wielded by each spouse 
out of love for the other as an expression of the spousal friendship that exists between them. 
 
The spousal relationship as a friendship of virtue 
When each spouse genuinely appreciates the value of the other and the personalistic norm 
becomes the normative response of each spouse in relation to the other, then the natural response 
of each person will be willing the good of the other for his own sake.138  A paramount expression 
of this mutual love of the other then becomes the spouses’ desire for growth in virtue both for 
one’s self and for the other.139  “Aristotle draws a strong tie between friendship and virtue—no 
good life is possible without intimate friends, the kind of friends who accompany, console, and 
challenge us to grow with them in virtue.”140  In a friendship of virtue, the spouses themselves 
strive for virtue and hold one another accountable to living virtuously.141   
It is most advantageous to have a virtuous spouse as a friend present to support and assist 
in times of difficulty (perhaps when one is struggling to maintain virtue) or loss, etc.  Yet, it is a 
fine thing to have spousal friendship in good times as well.  Regardless, the presence of 
                                                          
138 Both knowing the good and willing it require the development of virtues.  Human virtues are “firm attitudes, 
stable dispositions, habitual perfections of intellect and will that govern our actions, order our passions, and guide 
our conduct according to reason and faith.” (Catholic Church, 1804). 
139 “The friendship of decent people is decent, and increases the more often they meet.  And they seem to become 
still better from their activities and their mutual correction.  For each molds the other in what they approve of, so 
that ‘[you will learn] what is noble from noble people’” (Aristotle, 1172a). 
140 Fullam, 667 
141 “Equality and similarity, and above all the similarity of those who are similar in being virtuous, is friendship.  For 
virtuous people are enduringly [virtuous] in themselves, and enduring [friends] to each other.  They neither request 
nor provide assistance that requires base actions, but, you might even say, prevent this.  For it is proper to good 
people to avoid error themselves and not to permit it in their friends” (Aristotle, 1159b). 
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friendship in any time is pleasant.142  Spousal friendship disposes each to be eager to be at the 
side of his spouse in good times and bad.  When a spouse is experiencing difficulty, the proper 
response of spousal friendship is to extend one’s self in service to his spouse—not awaiting the 
other’s specific request for his spouse’s presence or assistance.  In good times too, the spouses 
should desire to spend time with one another.143   
Aristotle lists several dispositions of the virtuous individual.144  Such a person labors for 
his friends and for his country.  He is willing to die for either his friends or for his country if the 
need presented itself.  He willingly sacrifices money, honor, and contested goods in order to 
attain what is virtuous.  He chooses “a year of living finely over many years of undistinguished 
life.”  He chooses “a single fine and great action over many small actions.”  When he dies for 
another, he chooses something that is “fine for himself.”  He readily sacrifices “money as long as 
his friend’s profit; for the friends gain money, while he gains what is fine, and so he rewards 
himself with the greater good.”  He will choose what is fine “at the cost of everything.”  All of 
these things should be characteristic of each spouse in relation to the other.  If they are not, then 
either the spouses’ friendship or the individual virtue of one or both spouse(s) is lacking.   
This being said, there is something lacking in the human individual who has not 
intimately shared in the life of another.  The interpersonal exchange is a relationship exclusively 
shared by humans among all of the creatures of the earth.  While one can be fond of a dog or 
                                                          
142 cf. Aristotle, 1171a 
143 Each spouse must guard his desire from love of gain, lest their friendship become reduced to love of what is 
gained from the other (cf. Aristotle, 1171b). Still, Aristotle also warns also against becoming a “killjoy” because one 
desires to avoid being gifted by his friend. 
144 The following citations of this paragraph all come from the same section of the Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle, 
1169a). 
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some other pet, the gift of self cannot be made to any creature that is less than human since it 
cannot be reciprocated by any creature that is less than human.145  Yet it is possible for the 
converse to be true: that the love with which one loves another person is merely the love one 
might extend to irrational creatures or even inanimate objects.146  Given the depth of intimacy 
and the quality of endurance characteristic of the spousal relationship, to found the relationship 
upon anything less than a friendship of virtue would not fully appreciate the dignity of the 
persons engaged in the relationship.147 
                                                          
145 Aquinas affirms Aristotle’s teaching that, while we may be said to love soulless things, we cannot have 
friendship with them.  He then distinguishes this form of love as the love of concupiscence whereas the love 
between friends is the love of friendship.  The love we have for the friend himself is the love of friendship.  The love 
we have for the good thing that we will for the friend is the love of concupiscence.  Aquinas then uses an analogy to 
explain the difference.  As that which is may be called a being, that which exists in another being has relative being, 
that is, it exists in a dependent relationship with the thing that has being.  It is the distinction between essence and 
accident (what is essential to a thing and what is accidental to it).  Summa Theologica Ia IIae Q. 26 A. 4. 
146 Such a love is clearly not the love of friendship.  For, as Kerr points out, Aquinas’s understanding of friendship 
presupposes that “we have (1) to wish our friend well for his own sake; (2) the well-wishing has to be reciprocated; 
and (3) it has to be rooted in a certain community of life.  The object of friendship love has to be a being with his or 
her own separate and intrinsic value.  It cannot be a chattel or any extension of the one who is loving, as a bottle of 
wine or a horse would be.  One wishes the other well, that is to say, beginning from the acknowledgement of his or 
her independence and otherness.  You cannot be friends in the appropriate sense, with somebody who is your slave, 
infatuated with you, or one-sidedly dependent upon you in some other way.  Friendship is a kind of loving that 
respects and fosters the independent worth of the other person.  Secondly, for there to be friendship of the relevant 
kind, the parties have to have this attitude toward one another: each has to be able to let the other be, so to speak.  
Thirdly, they have to have something in common which gives rise to and sustains this relationship.  On Aristotle’s 
view, friendship of this kind exists only between persons who resemble each other in being virtuous.  The 
relationship is grounded on shared goodness of character.  This is a daring model for charity (Kerr, “Charity as 
Friendship,” 6-7). 
147 In his encyclical letter, Humanae Vitae, Pope Paul VI wrote that “Married love particularly reveals its true nature 
and nobility when we realize that it takes its origin from God, who "is love" (cf. John 4:8), the Father "from whom 
every family in heaven and on earth is named" (Ephesians 3:15).  Marriage, then, is far from being the effect of 
chance or the result of the blind evolution of natural forces. It is in reality the wise and provident institution of God 
the Creator, whose purpose was to [effect] in man His loving design. As a consequence, husband and wife, through 
that mutual gift of themselves, which is specific and exclusive to them alone, develop that union of two persons in 
which they perfect one another, cooperating with God in the generation and rearing of new lives.  The marriage of 
those who have been baptized is, in addition, invested with the dignity of a sacramental sign of grace, for it 
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That dignity, therefore, demands that the friendship of spouses not be a merely selfish 
pursuit for personal gain.  If the person is to be loved in the married state according to his 
dignity, then spousal friendship must be aimed at the pursuit of a common good that will 
facilitate the reciprocity of their love.148   
 
The pursuit of a common good in spousal friendship 
The commitment of marriage is safeguarded by the free expression of the love of spousal 
friendship wherein the vulnerability necessary for growth may be balanced by a persistent 
acceptance of the other so as to alleviate the fear of rejection; whereas, relationships that lack 
comparable commitment may easily find an excuse for dissolution.149  The disintegration of 
relationships is harmful to the person and permanent friendship stays that harm by fostering a 
deep and intimate human relationship.  Considering that to be human is to be a social creature (as 
stated earlier), it becomes clear that one cannot live an authentically human life without deep 
inter-human relationships.  Seeing the other and seeking the good for that person both supposes 
an enduring relationship and sustains it once it is present.  Spousal friendship prevents 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
represents the union of Christ and His Church.” Paul VI, Humanae Vitae [On the Regulation of Birth], (Vatican 
Website, accessed December 10, 2014, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-
vi_enc_25071968_humanae-vitae_en.html). 8. 
148 Wojtyla… argues [together with Aristotle] that “the only way two human persons can avoid using one another is 
to relate in pursuit of a common good, as in virtuous friendship” (Sri, 15). 
149 Dietrich Von Hildebrand. Marriage: the Mystery of Faithful Love.  (Manchester, New Hampshire: Sophia 
Institute Press, 1991) xi.  In her introduction to her husband’s text on marriage, Alice Von Hildebrand writes that 
Marriage gives love the structure, the shelteredness, the climate in which alone it can grow.  Marriage teaches 
spouses humility and makes them realize that the human person is a very poor lover.  Much as we long to love and 
to be loved, we repeatedly fall short and desperately need help.  We must bind ourselves through sacred vows so that 
the bond will grant our love the strength necessary to face the tempest-tossed sea of our human condition (Von 
Hildebrand, xi). 
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disintegration because it is, by its nature, an enduring relationship.  Marriage requires such an 
enduring relationship; it is a partnership of the whole life.150   
After presenting the negative effects of use on the person in relationships in his book, 
Love and Responsibility, Pope Saint John Paul II presents the positive formulation of the proper 
disposition owed to persons.  The personalistic norm insures that persons are viewed as ends in 
themselves and not merely as means (as was discussed earlier in this essay).  Now John Paul II 
writes of the nature of the good that is mutually willed by each spouse in friendship.  For the 
good to be mutually willed a couple of things are necessary: (1) each spouse must desire it, (2) 
each spouse must know the end desired by the other, see it as good, and adopt it himself.  When 
this happens, “a special bond is established between [them]: the bond of a common good and of a 
common aim.”151  He claims that, once established, this special bond places the spouses upon “a 
footing of equality, and precludes the possibility that one of them might be subordinated to the 
other.”152 
Spouses avoid harming one another by adopting the ends of marriage as common goods.  
Without the mutual dedication to the common good, spouses tend towards subordinating each 
other to the satisfication of personal goals; this tendency destroys the equality and the reciprocity 
that is crucial for the love of spousal friendship.  Following Aristotle’s insight that relationships 
based upon only pleasure are not sustained beyond the endurance of the pleasure from which 
they originated, Saint John Paul II argues that “the only way two human persons can avoid using 
                                                          
150 Pius XI, 23 (emphasis added).  Marriage entails the establishment of “a partnership of the whole life… ordered 
toward the good of the spouses and the procreation and education of offspring; this covenant between baptized 
persons has been raised by Christ the Lord to the dignity of a sacrament.” Catholic Church, 1601 
151 Wojtyla, 28 
152 Wojtyla, 28-29 
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one another is to relate in pursuit of a common good, as in virtuous friendship.”153  A spousal 
relationship built upon mutual self-gratification is unsustainable.  By neglecting the good of the 
other, the relationship tends toward disintegration through the [possibly] gradual reduction of 
each individual person to the status of a mere object of use. 
 
Spousal friendship leads to betrothed love 
Willing the good of the spouse for his own sake by virtue of friendship love is good; it both 
safeguards the possibility of the flourishing of each person and facilitates that flourishing 
through mutual help.154  The spouses make that friendship—their partnership of their whole 
lives—the good toward which they mutually strive.  Yet, perhaps most importantly, spousal 
friendship facilitates the manifestation of betrothed love.  In Love and Responsibility, John Paul 
II wrote of the development of love in the subjects from sympathy eventually to friendship.155  It 
is within the context of spousal friendship that the spouses are able to experience the intimacy of 
betrothed love. 
John Paul II identified betrothed love as distinct from every other kind of love that has 
been examined in this essay and in his book, Love and Responsibility, he writes that:  
[Betrothed love’s] decisive character is the giving of one’s own person (to another).  The essence 
of betrothed love is self-giving, the surrender of one’s ‘I’.  This is something different from and 
more than attraction, desire or even goodwill.  These are all ways by which one person goes out 
towards another, but none of them can take him as far in his quest for the good of another as does 
betrothed love.  ‘To give oneself to another’ is something more than merely ‘desiring what is 
                                                          
153 Sri, 15 
154 Through the mutual help of the spouses in friendship, they each grow more deeply in pursuing virtue and 
avoiding vice.  In this way, their spousal friendship both facilitates their personal flourishing in virtue, and helps 
them to avoid the harms of disintegration discussed in the first chapter of this essay. 
155 Wojtyla, 88-95 
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good’ for another—even if as a result of this another ‘I’ becomes as it were my own, as it does in 
friendship.  Betrothed love is something different from and more than all the forms of love so far 
analyzed, both as it affects the individual subject, the person who loves, and as regards the 
interpersonal union which it creates.  When betrothed love enters into this interpersonal 
relationship something more than friendship results: two people give themselves to each other.156 
 
In this quote, John Paul II sets betrothed love apart from “attraction, desires or even goodwill”—
that is, from each type of love that has been explored in this essay, including the love of 
friendship.  The action of betrothed love goes beyond even the love of friendship: willing the 
other’s good for the other’s own sake; it becomes a personal exchange whereby the spouse 
himself becomes the good that is given to the other for the other’s sake.  The nature of betrothed 
love is that each spouse gives himself totally to the other.157  In friendship, each spouse has 
willed the good of the other for the other’s own sake—as another self; the good mutually pursued 
by each of the spouses in friendship is their flourishing and growth in virtue.  But betrothed love 
involves the surrender of one’s ‘I’.  This is similar but distinct from friendship; it assumes 
friendship and goes much deeper.158  Rather than willing the good of the other for his own sake, 
in betrothed love, the spouse wills himself to the other in love.   
                                                          
156 Wojtyla, 96 
157 In his summary of Wojtyla’s Love and Repsonsibility, William E. May writes that: “A paradox is involved here, 
for persons are incommunicable, yet in betrothed love there is a full communication of persons, what Wojtyla later will 
term a communio personarum--a full surrendering of the self to another without losing possession of the self. What is 
paradoxical is that "in giving ourselves we find clear proof that we possess ourselves" (Wojtyla, 98). "The concept of 
betrothed love implies the giving of the individual person to another chosen person" (Wojtyla, 98). Marriage is rooted in 
betrothed love, which satisfies the demands of the personalistic norm. "This giving of oneself....cannot, in marriage or 
indeed in any relationship between persons of the opposite sex, have a merely sexual significance. Giving oneself only 
sexually, without the full gift of person to validate it, must lead to...utilitarianism....A personalistic interpretation is 
absolutely necessary." Marriage is the "result of this form of love" (Wojtyla, 99).” William E. May.  “Karol Wojtyla’s 
Love and Responsibility: A Summary.” (Accessed December 22, 2014: http://www.christendom-
awake.org/pages/may/summaryofl&r.htm).  
158 In his doctoral dissertation, John J. Fitzgerald writes of John Paul II’s betrothed love that: “It “consists precisely 
in self-giving, in making one’s inalienable and non-transferable ‘I’ someone else’s property” (Wojtyla, 97).  While 
betrothed love is distinct from any other form or element of love, it “can nevertheless not develop in isolation from 
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Surrender of the ‘I’ is a radical surrender of the will; it is a submission of one’s claim to 
mastery over his own will to the other.159  But in betrothed love, it cannot be a merely slavish 
submission—it is a joyous one.160  John Paul II later writes that “[betrothed] love forcibly 
detaches the person, so to speak, from [his] natural inviolability and inalienability.  It makes the 
person want to do just that—surrender itself to another, to the one it loves.”161  In betrothed love, 
the person actually desires to surrender his own will in order to be united to the other in 
betrothed love.  Yet, submission is the path taken by love, not its end.  It does not entail slavish 
subjection, but a willing obedience.  The submission “enlarges and enriches the existence of the 
person… the lover ‘goes outside’ the self to find a fuller existence in another.”162  Thus, the 
person is not diminished but expanded through the experience of mutual submission.163   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
them”; in particular, it must “ally itself closely with goodwill and friendship” (Wojtyla, 100).” John J. Fitzgerald, 
“Doing Good (or Evil) and Personal Fulfillment in the Thought of Abraham Joshua and Karol Wojtyla/John Paul 
II.” A Dissertation for the Degree: Doctor of Philosophy. The Catholic University of America: Washington, D.C.  
(2008). (Accessed December 22, 2014: https://books.google.com/books?id=weLJGnbCM2UC&printsec=frontcover 
&hl=pl#v=onepage&q&f=false). 167. 
159 The submission of betrothed love can be made either to another person or to God (cf. Wojtyla, 97).  Yet, if it is 
made to another person, then it is only fittingly done within the context of marriage (Fitzgerald, 167; cf. Wojtyla, 
99).  How it is given to God will be explored shortly.   
160 John Paul II writes that “contrary to the superficial view of sex, according to which love (meaning here erotic 
love) culminates in a woman’s surrender of her body to a man, we should rightly speak of the mutual surrender of 
both persons, of their belonging equally to each other.  Not mutual sexual exploitation, with ‘x’ giving her body for 
‘y’ to possess, so that each can obtain the maximum sexual pleasure, but the reciprocated gift of self, so that two 
persons belong each to the other—this is the only full and satisfactory description of ‘betrothed love’, which finds its 
fulfillment in marriage.” Wojtyla, 126. 
161 Wojtyla, 125 
162 Wojtyla, 126 
163 Fitzgerald argues that Wojtyla has always held (from before and after being named pope) that “through self-gift 
in general we achieve an increase in perfection or fulfillment.  In particular, he stresses that in order to attain eternal 
life, it is ‘essential’ to make a gift of self patterned after that of the Good Samaritan.  He adds in Fides et Ratio that 
self-giving helps one find a ‘fullness of certainty and security,’ terms that could be part of ‘subjective happiness’ and 
meaning.” Fitzgerald, 171-172. 
55 
 
The self-surrender of betrothed love “is the result of a process within the person, and 
presupposes a mature vision of values, and a will ready and able to commit itself in this 
particular way.  Betrothed love can never be a fortuitous or imperfect event in the inner life of 
the person.  It always constitutes a special crystallization of the whole human ‘I’, determined 
because of its love to dispose of itself in this particular way.  In giving ourselves we find clear 
proof that we possess ourselves.”164   
The reciprocal exchange of betrothed love between the husband and wife involves both 
the total gift of self and the reception of that gift.  The mystery of reciprocity into which this 
exchange is caught up is that “acceptance must also be giving, and giving receiving.  Love is of 
its nature reciprocal.”165  Both the man and woman must grow in their capacity to genuinely 
affirm the value of the other person through this exchange.  The delicate nature of the exchange 
reveals that the inner structure of spousal friendship is essential to betrothed love.166 
Betrothed love is a deeper love than spousal friendship itself; yet spousal friendship may 
be said to be ordered to the expression of betrothed love.  To say that spousal friendship is 
ordered to betrothed love and that betrothed love is something deeper suggests that the nature of 
the relationship from which betrothed love emerges is a distinctively spousal friendship.  The 
distinctive self-gift that is both exchanged and received between persons in betrothed love moves 
the couple toward a commonality of will.  Yet, the basis of this commonality of will arising from 
                                                          
164 Wojtyla, 97-98 
165 Wojtyla, 129 
166 Wojtyla, 129 
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the mutual exchange of total self-gift is properly directed by and ordered to the love of God—lest 
it should lead to the formation of a relationship of co-dependence.167   
The scriptures depict the depth of God’s intimate love for the human race in spousal 
language;168 the nature of the love that is being expressed through these references is betrothed 
love.  Betrothed love is the sort of love that most accurately reflects God’s love for us and is the 
love by which we are called to love Him in return and our neighbors for love of Him.169  
Betrothed love, then, is a deeper participation in the divine.  It entails, as Benedict XVI 
describes, the purification of eros love by which and through which our love most perfectly 
                                                          
167 In the fourth book of his Confessions, Saint Augustine describes a friendship that he had with an unnamed friend 
that had become a relationship of co-dependence, though it was a friendship of profound intimacy.  While this was 
not a spousal friendship, the example at least offers a real-life illustration of the dangers of intimate relationships 
dissolving to co-dependence.  Intimacy alone is an insufficient basis for authentic friendship.  Augustine argued that 
this relationship, though profoundly intimate, was not authentic friendship since it was not rooted in the love of God.  
Augustine, Confessions, 71-90; Miller, 394. 
168 cf. Isaiah 54:5; Jeremiah 3:14, 20-22; Ephesians 5:25  
169 Jesus issued His command that we love as He loved us: “A new commandment I give to you, that you love one 
another; even as I have loved you, that you also love one another” (John 13:34, RSV); “This is my commandment, 
that you love one another as I have loved you. Greater love has no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his 
friends. You are my friends if you do what I command you. No longer do I call you servants, for the servant does 
not know what his master is doing; but I have called you friends, for all that I have heard from my Father I have 
made known to you. You did not choose me, but I chose you and appointed you that you should go and bear fruit 
and that your fruit should abide; so that whatever you ask the Father in my name, he may give it to you. This I 
command you, to love one another” (John 15:12-17, RSV).  In Love and Responsibility, “Wojtyla links the 
commandment of love more directly to betrothed love than to any other of the aforementioned elements and kinds of 
love; ‘[T]he moral code which has the commandment to love at its centre finds itself in perfect agreement with the 
identification of marriage with betrothed love…’ (Wojtyla, 99; cf. John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor, § 15).” 
Fitzgerald, 167. 
The paradoxical-sounding language of betrothed love is expressed in Matthew 10:39: “He who finds his 
life will lose it, and he who loses his life for my sake will find it” (Matthew 10:39, RSV).  While the English 
translation of the RSV might not capture the depth of this passage’s meaning, John Paul II cites this passage, noting 
its paradox, to illustrate the Gospel reality that “the fullest, the most uncompromising form of love consists precisely 
in selfgiving, in making one’s inalienable and non-transferable ‘I’ someone else’s property.  This is doubly 
paradoxical: firstly in that it is possible to step outside one’s own ‘I’ in this way, and secondly in that the ‘I’ far from 
being destroyed or impaired as a result is enlarged and enriched—of course in a super-physical, moral sense.” 
Wojtyla, 97. 
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imitates the love of God.  This betrothed love has its most natural context within spousal 
friendship—yet, even celibate men and women are called by God to live it in relation to Him and 
through relationship with Him, to live it in relation to all of humanity.  Betrothed love—the total 
self-gift made to another—as it is expressed in spousal friendship speaks to every human 
vocation of the truth of love toward which all are called.170 
 
Summary 
Friendship is indeed crucial to the spousal relationship.  Given the importance of friendship to 
the relationship of the spouses and their good, spousal friendship is necessary for marriage.  
Now, this is not to say that those couples who have married prior to being genuine friends may 
not mature their relationship to become a genuine friendship.  However, it does entail that in the 
                                                          
170 Likewise, celibate vocations, with their deliberate orientation in this life toward the life to come, can inspire 
persons living the vocation of married life to remain steadfast in their love for God—in Whom is their source of joy 
and life and love.  In this way, each vocation speaks to the others about the nature of the common destination toward 
which we are all drawn by love—God Himself.  Thus all vocations are caught up in a dialogue with one another 
through which each manifests some profound truth about God; the vocation of marriage, in particular, teaches 
human kind about the nature of betrothed love.  All vocations are called to live the commandment to love (cf. 
Wojtyla, 258). 
In his doctoral dissertation, Fitzgerald seems to draw similar conclusions about the relationship between 
betrothed love and vocations; he writes:  “As for particular manifestations of betrothed love, Wojtyla maintains that 
one has “the best possible grounds for speaking of betrothed love in connection with matrimony” (Wojtyla, 98).   He 
also discusses betrothed love in connection with “mystical virginity—conjugal love pledged to God himself” 
(Wojtyla, 251).  He is somewhat ambiguous on the question of whether betrothed love can also be found in other 
relationships (e.g., doctor/patient, teacher/student, pastor/soul); at the least, he does seem to allow the possibility that 
these relationships can reflect a “form of behavior [that] comes to resemble a complete surrender of the self and so 
establishes its claim to be love” (Wojtyla, 98.  While Wojtyla does not cite the work of Dietrich von Hidebrand in 
Love and Responsibility, John Grabowski suggests that Wojtyla may in his discussion of betrothed love be “building 
on von Hidebrand’s analysis of ‘wedded love.’”  John S. Grabowski, personal correspondence with the author, 
October 10, 2007.).”  Fitzgerald, 167-168. 
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absence of genuine friendship what is sacred and essential to the very nature of marriage is at 
stake and the spouses may suffer greatly from this omission.   
As has been said, a truly human life must consist of some true friendships.  Similarly, a 
truly healthy spousal relationship will be based in the mutual friendship of the spouses.  This 
spousal friendship facilitates and fosters betrothed love.  Yet, there remains in the human heart a 
void for love that cannot be filled with the affections of any creature; God alone is capable of 
filling this deep longing.  Also, the betrothed love of the spouses reflects the love of the Persons 
of the Trinity; grace is the source of strength and endurance for the spouses and imitation of the 
love of God—divine love—is the way by which the spousal love is purified and made whole.  
Therefore, spousal friendship is necessary for marriage; friendship with God is needed by each 
individual, regardless of their vocation—but in the marital context, it protects spousal friendship.  
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Chapter III:  
Why and how friendship with God  
protects spousal friendship. 
 
In the first chapter of this essay, the nature of romantic passion and why a relationship based 
upon it alone cannot sustain the spousal relationship were explored.  The second chapter of this 
essay explored why and how spousal friendship is needed to both: prevent disintegration and 
facilitate the expression of distinctively spousal love within marriage.  This third chapter of the 
essay will explore the nature and importance of friendship with God in protecting spousal 
friendship. 
 
The nature of God’s relationship with us 
The nature of God’s relationship with His creatures seems to change over the course of the 
history accounted in Scripture.  Yet, this seeming change in God’s disposition toward us is 
actually not a change in God but a gradual transformation in our own understanding of His 
dynamic love.  What came into being ex nihilo171 as good, yet rebelled against the Being through 
                                                          
171 Literally: “from nothing”. 
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Whom it came to be, has been radically pursued by Him ever since.  We human creatures have 
been privileged among all of creation to have received into our race the very God from Whom 
we came into being.  If the purpose of what was written in the Old Testament could be summed 
up into one phrase, it might very well be, God desired to make His dwelling with Man.172  It is 
about relationship—a depth of relationship not fully realized by man until the Incarnation of 
Jesus Christ.  For this reason, and since He took upon Himself our very nature, we can say that 
Christ came to reveal Man to himself.173   
 
Charity as friendship 
Christ brings the Pagan notion of friendship to an unforeseeable fulfillment: Christian friendship 
maintains the good of natural friendships that were accessible to the pagan philosophers, but 
expands the notion of friendship beyond the limitations of mere nature by infusing a supernatural 
potency to friendship: the possibility of friendship with God.174  This infusion expands the proper 
                                                          
172 The Catechism of the Catholic Church says that God desires “to communicate his own divine life to men he 
freely created, in order to adopt them as his sons in his only-begotten Son.  By revealing himself God wishes to 
make them capable of responding to him, and of knowing him, and of loving him far beyond their own natural 
capacity” (Catholic Church, 52).  This is ultimately accomplished by Jesus Christ on Calvary.  Now we are able to 
enter into an intimate relationship with Him through Jesus’ Sonship.  Thus, friendship with God in the Christian 
sense is only possible through the mediation of Christ and our sonship in the Son. 
173 cf. Gaudium et Spes, 22 
174 In his Master’s Thesis, Friendship in the Scriptures, Fr. Benjamin J. Hadrich found that there are four features of 
the “friends of God” in Scripture.  He draws these features from the examples of Abraham and Moses in the Old 
Testament and then links them to the New Testament by citing the fifteenth chapter of John’s Gospel.  Ultimately, 
Fr. Hadrich’s work is building up to Jesus’ discussion of friendship with His disciples in John 15 at the end of his 
essay.  The four features of the friends of God is Scripture are: (1) that they were chosen by God (cf. John 15:16; 
also the calls of both Abraham and Moses), (2) that those who are chosen answer the call of God, (3) that those who 
were chosen and respond to the call of God experience Him in “profoundly intimate ways” and (4) that after the 
experience of God in profoundly intimate ways, they depart from that experience “to facilitate a relationship 
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domain of friendship beyond the limits of the natural and elevates the potential of friendship.  
Saint Thomas Aquinas cites John 15:15, “I will not now call you servants… but My friends,” 
claiming that Jesus’ words are spoken “by reason of nothing else than charity” and thus that 
“charity is friendship.”175  While some loves do not have the character of friendship, the love 
coupled with benevolence is proper to charity-friendship.   
That Aquinas relied heavily upon the works of Aristotle and Saint Augustine in his own 
writings was mentioned in the previous chapter of this essay.176  In his book Friends of God, 
Paul J. Wadell, C.P. argues that Saint Thomas Aquinas’ definition of charity as friendship with 
God offers “an interpretive key” through which to properly understand Aquinas’ entire moral 
theology in the Summa Theologica—but especially the Prima Secundae.177  By defining charity 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
between God and men.”  Benjamin J. Hadrich. “Friendship in the Scriptures.” Master of Arts in Theology (Sacred 
Scripture) Thesis. Saint Paul Seminary School of Divinity: Saint Paul, MN (May, 2012) 32-33. 
175 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, IIa IIae Q. 23 A. 1. 
176 These two writers are especially prominent in Aquinas’ synthesis of the Christian theological tradition, called the 
Summa Theologica. 
177 Wadell, Friends of God, 1; likewise, Anthony Keaty claims that “while drawing upon Aristotle’s account of 
friendship, Thomas at the same time transforms, or attempts to transform, Aristotle’s account of friendship by 
placing the moral life within the context of friendship with God, a form of friendship Aristotle could not envision… 
As Trinity, the most sublime activity is friendship; to identify charity as friendship should signify a participation by 
the human person in the divine activity of Trinitarian friendship.” Anthony W. Keaty, “Charity as Friendship.” The 
Thomist. (1998): 583. 
 In a similar vein, in the 19th chapter of her book Ultimate Normative Foundations, Dr. Mary Lemmons 
convincingly argues for a personlistic natural law rooted in Thomistic principles that “is able to advance the cause of 
sexual equality and the dignity of women in the twenty-first century” (Lemmons, Ultimate Normative Foundations, 
380). She points out that certain errors in Aquinas’s moral theology regarding the alleged inequality of women to 
men are rooted in the flawed biology of Aristotle.  But these, she claims, do not actually form the basis of Aquinas’s 
moral principles.  Thus these errors grounded in Aristotle’s flawed biology can be dismissed without affecting the 
integrity of the moral principles themselves.  The normative foundations of moral theology in Aquinas are not to be 
found in the flawed biology of his day, but upon the obligations of love (cf. Lemmons, Ultimate Normative 
Foundations, 378-379). 
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as friendship with God, Aquinas communicates some essential components of this theological 
virtue that are to be lived out in the Christian life.178   
First of all, it is about relationship.  Friendship supposes a two way relationship where the 
individuals are mutually willing good things of the other.  The first move of the relationship is 
made by God in loving the individual.179  It is not possibly a friendship until the individual 
reciprocates, according to his ability, that love.  Now, the love with which one loves another for 
the other’s own sake as another self is a love that Aquinas calls benevolence.180  This love of 
benevolence is extended perfectly by God to the individual creature, but can only be reciprocated 
by that individual to the extent that his natural virtues have been developed.181  In this way, the 
                                                          
178 Fr. Stephen F. Brett suggests that Aquinas made six major contributions to the understanding of friendship: “(1) 
the virtue of love as the template for friendship; (2) self-giving as the heart of friendship; (3) beatitude, the life of 
integral happiness inseparable from the Gospel, as the paramount goal of friendship; (4) a contemplative aspect of 
friendship, respectful of prayer and worship, moves friendship beyond the level of superficial bonhomie; (5) caritas 
is nothing other than friendship with God, elevating the Aristotelian elements of friendship into the orbit of grace; 
(6) the conversation or communion essential to friendship is now predicated on the richness of divine revelation, 
truths unknown to reason alone” (Brett, 19). 
179 In his encyclical Deus Caritas Est, Pope Benedict XVI writes that “He has loved us first and he continues to do 
so; we too, then, can respond with love. God does not demand of us a feeling which we ourselves are incapable of 
producing. He loves us, he makes us see and experience his love, and since he has ‘loved us first’, love can also 
blossom as a response within us.  In the gradual unfolding of this encounter, it is clearly revealed that love is not 
merely a sentiment. Sentiments come and go. A sentiment can be a marvelous first spark, but it is not the fullness of 
love” (Benedict, 17). 
180 cf. Summa Theologica, IIa IIa Q.23, A.1. 
181 Although charity is a theological virtue given by God, it has a natural form as well.  The individual is given a 
superabundance of supernatural virtues by God, but what is received by the individual is received according to the 
capacities developed by him with the aid of God’s grace.  So, it is possible that the superabundance given by God 
might not be fully received by the individual—and different people will receive various degrees of this 
superabundance according to the dispositions they have developed.  Thus, “each act of charity disposes to an 
increase of charity, in so far as one act of charity makes man more ready to act again according to charity, and this 
readiness increasing, man breaks out into an act of more fervent love, and strives to advance in charity, and then his 
charity increases actually.” Aquinas, Summa Theologica, IIa IIae Q. 24 Art. 6. 
63 
 
relationship of friendship with God is a relationship of an inferior with his Superior.182  
Nevertheless, even Aristotle proposed that friendship could still be formed in such relationships 
of inequality.183   
Aristotle argued that for the highest form of friendship to be present, each party must 
genuinely will the good of the other for the other’s own sake and the reciprocated goodwill of 
each party must be known to the other.184  The pursuit of the good binds each friend to the other.  
Meanwhile, the quality of this shared good determines the very quality of the friendship between 
them.185  The good that is shared between the individual and God in the formation of friendship 
with God is His happiness which “He communicates… to us.”186  This divine happiness is 
attained only through union with God in friendship. 
This point should not be taken lightly.  The previous chapter of this essay argued that 
spousal friendship is needed for marriage.  The good pursued by the spouses who are friends of 
one another might be called “flourishing” or virtuous living.  But, this is not the whole picture.  
Each wills the good of the other for the other’s own sake as another self—as he wills that good 
for himself.  But if the greatest good that can be sought for an individual entails the ultimate 
flourishing of the individual, then that greatest good for the individual is union with God.  Thus, 
each individual wills for himself union with God and, by extension, wills union with God to his 
                                                          
182 Still, friendship can be formed within a relationship of inequality, as Aristotle indicated; it is facilitated by the 
exercise of virtue in the one whose virtue is superior to the other (in this case, God).  That friendship is possible with 
God, however, was not known to Aristotle. 
183 cf. Aristotle, 1159a-1159b 
184 Aristotle, 1155b, 1156a 
185 cf. Wadell, Friends of God, 3-4; Wadell further points out that the intimacy between friends does not come about 
from their deliberate desire to experience it, but rather “intimacy comes from desiring a good that is loved by both.” 
186 Summa Theologica, IIa IIa Q.23, A.1. 
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friend as another self.  The experience of temporal happiness in Aristotle’s account of the 
virtuous life gives way to a genuine experience of divine beatitude.187   
Aquinas argues that charity can be perfect in this life; but he makes a distinction.  The 
perfection of charity possible in this life is the very perfection of God.  As the object of the 
individual’s love and the mutual good shared between God and that individual, charity is perfect.  
Yet, the degree to which the very perfections of God have been attained in the individual will 
vary and ultimately cannot be perfectly manifested in the individual in this life.  As Aquinas 
himself says, “no creature can love [God] infinitely since all created power is finite.”188   
Nevertheless, imperfect as our love may be we offer it to God in friendship.  Since God 
loves us perfectly, when the individual authentically gives his entire—though imperfect—love as 
a total self-gift to God, the love reciprocated between that individual and God forms an authentic 
friendship.189  Saint Francis De Sales writes of this loving exchange of friendship between God 
and the individual in his book On the Love of God.  He writes: 
[Charity] is a form of friendship and disinterested love, since by charity we love God for his own 
sake because of his most supremely pleasing goodness.  Such friendship is true friendship, since 
it is reciprocal, for God has eternally loved all those who have loved him, now love him, or will 
love him in time.  It is manifested and recognized mutually: God cannot be ignorant of the love 
we have for him since he himself has given it to us, while we cannot be ignorant of his love for us 
since he has made it so widely known and we on our part acknowledge that whatever good we 
possess is the true effect of his good will.  In fine, we are in continual communication with him 
and he never ceases to speak to our hearts by his inspirations, allurements, and sacred 
movements.  He never ceases to do us good or to give us every kind of proof as to his most holy 
                                                          
187 Aristotle perceived of happiness as “an array of authentic goods that ennoble the human spirit” and not merely as 
an emotional experience (Brett, 16).  While both Aristotle’s eudemonia (Aristotle, 1095a) and Aquinas’ beatitudo 
claim to be the experience of Man’s ultimate happiness and fulfillment, eudemonia is caught up in the temporal 
realm and beatitudo cannot be fully experienced until heaven. 
188 Summa Theologica, IIa IIa Q.23, A.8. 
189 The total self-gift made by the individual to God reflects the very love of God, though in an imperfect fashion.  It 
is the love expressed within the spousal context as ‘betrothed love’—and we are meant to learn the nature of this 
love, in part, through the experience of the loving exchange of total self-gift between spouses. 
65 
 
affection.  He has openly revealed all his secrets to us as to his closest friends.  To climax his holy 
and loving dealings with us, he has made himself our food in the most holy sacrament of the 
Eucharist.  As for ourselves, we have freedom to speak to him in devout prayer whenever we 
wish, for we have all our life, movement, and being not only with him but in him and by him.190   
 
God’s love is unconditionally extended to all those who have loved him, now love him, or will 
love him in time.  The love by which we reciprocate love with God is itself a gift from Him.  
Indeed, the extent to which we can love God for His own sake is expanded by our participation 
in the total self-gift made at Calvary mediated to us by Him through the sacrament of the 
Eucharist.  Through prayer and participation in Christ’s total self-gift, the individual’s capacity 
for charity is enlarged and his love is purified.  The implications of this transformation of love 
through love apply foremostly to his relationship with God and secondarily with the relationship 
to others.  This point will be taken up again shortly. 
If God’s own happiness—His own supremely pleasing goodness—is the good for which 
each spouse is engaged in friendship with God, then the flourishing of that relationship is also 
the good willed by each member of a spousal friendship.  With the very happiness of God as 
their shared good, the spouses may actually become caught up in a three way relationship: man, 
woman, and God; only when God is present in marriage do the deepest desires of the spouses’ 
hearts find rest. 
                                                          
190 Saint Francis De Sales, On the Love of God (Translated by John K. Ryan. Rockford, IL: Tan Books and 
Publishers, Inc., 1975) 160-161. 
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Moving toward friendship with God 
In Book II of the Confessions, Augustine describes a point in his life where he “cared for nothing 
but to love and to be loved.”191  During this period of his life, Augustine gave himself over to his 
lustful passions and adolescent sex.  “Love and lust together seethed within me,” he writes.  “In 
my tender youth they swept me away over the precipice of my body’s appetites and plunged me 
in the whirlpool of sin.”192  Notably, he makes a remark about friendship in this same section of 
his book.  The self-gratifying love that he experienced at that time in his life, he describes in 
language of disorder and darkness; whereas, the friendship to which he referred is described as a 
source of light which he had already stepped beyond.  Yet, a little further on he says that at that 
time: “I surrendered myself entirely to lust.”193 
Augustine begins Book III with another reference to friendship and how his lust had 
“muddied the stream of friendship.”194  He goes on to say:  
I had not yet fallen in love, but I was in love with the idea of it, and this feeling that something 
was missing made me despise myself for not being more anxious to satisfy the need.  I began to 
look around for some object for my love, since I badly wanted to love something.  I had no liking 
for the safe path without pitfalls, for although my real need was for you, my God, who are the 
food of the soul, I was not aware of this hunger.195 
 
What must be pointed out here is that the mature Augustine (who is writing the Confessions) has 
already tasted the experience of friendship with God.  The language of his text is imbued with 
loving language of a dialogue between himself and God.  Augustine analyzes his desires from 
                                                          
191 Augustine. Confessions, 43 
192 Augustine. Confessions, 43 
193 Augustine. Confessions, 44 
194 Augustine. Confessions, 55 
195 Augustine. Confessions, 55 
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that period of his life in light of his profound encounter with God that came much later.  His 
earlier misapplications of the love of concupiscence are now viewed in light of his deep 
encounter with God.   
In his book, The Spiritual Life: A Treatise on Ascetical and Mystical Theology, Adolphe 
Tanquerey writes that “those advancing in the way of perfection practice the love of 
complacency, of benevolence, of conformity to the will of God, and thereby arrive at the love of 
friendship.”196  The above-referenced quote from Saint Augustine’s Confessions shows that he 
experienced this journey in his own life.   
Tanquerey offers some insights into the individual’s progress in the practice of charity.  
In general, one must remember that charity is ordered first to the love of God and second to the 
love of neighbor.  By virtue of this ordering, growth in one’s love for God purifies both one’s 
love for God and one’s love of neighbor.  Thus, growth in one’s love for God directly affects his 
love for neighbor as well.197  As the spousal relationship exists between a man and a woman—
two human creatures—that relationship is directly affected by the purification of love through 
loving God. 
                                                          
196 Adolphe Tanquerey. The Spiritual Life: A Treatise on Ascetical and Mystical Theology. (Belgium: Desclee & 
Co., 1932) 574  
197 cf. Tanquerey, 574 
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The deepest longings of the human heart 
In her introduction to her (deceased) husband’s text Marriage, Alice Von Hildebrand wrote of 
the universal human longing for love—to love and to be loved.198  Yet, this common human 
experience is incapable of being satiated by the affections exchanged in any merely creaturely 
(natural) relationship—friendship.  As Alice Von Hildebrand writes, “every merely natural love 
is necessarily tragic: it will never achieve the eternal union for which it naturally longs.”199  So 
something else is needed; some relationship which is much deeper. 
Saint Augustine wrote of this deep longing in his book, Confessions.  Augustine wrote 
that his heart was restless until it found its rest in the Lord.200  The danger that many people fall 
into is trying to satisfy this longing by investing themselves—their hearts—in relationships with 
things or with people who will, in some way, eventually let them down.  It is inevitable.  Yet the 
profound desire remains that cannot be satiated by any finite creature; this reality makes 
friendship with God crucial to a flourishing spousal friendship—lest the spouses attempt to 
satiate the longing for eternal love only through their reciprocated gift of self.   
As was discussed in the introduction to this essay, all Mankind is affected by the sin of 
Adam and Eve.  Our wills are disordered.  We do not always do what is good for us or others; 
the original communion of persons is disrupted.201  Yet, infidelities that occur in intimate human 
relationships cut very deeply, leaving wounds that do not easily heal.   
                                                          
198 cf. Von Hildebrand, xi 
199 Von Hildebrand, xiii 
200 cf. Augustine, Confessions, 21  
201 cf. Catholic Church, 1607 
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When the couple marries, their commitment extends beyond the “you and I” to a third 
party: God.  Now, children, society, friends, family, etc. are also affected by their choice to 
commit their whole lives to one another.  But the relationship itself is directly enacted between 
these three persons: the husband, the wife and God.  In Christian marriage, the spouses commit 
to mutual subjection in imitation of the love between Christ and His Church.  That love was a 
love unto death.  Jesus Christ literally gave up His life in loving submission to the will of God 
His Father in order to bring redemption to a fallen race.  Friendship with God and the role of that 
relationship in our human relationships is articulated in the 24th paragraph of Gaudium et Spes: 
God, Who has fatherly concern for everyone, has willed that all men should constitute one family 
and treat one another in a spirit of brotherhood. For having been created in the image of God, 
Who "from one man has created the whole human race and made them live all over the face of 
the earth" (Acts 17:26), all men are called to one and the same goal, namely God Himself.202 
 
We have been made in the image of God.  We come from God, and our final goal is God.  
God was the first agent to act in this relationship.  It only makes sense, then, that we should 
strive to foster a healthy relationship with the One from Whom we have come and to Whom we 
now journey.203  Likewise, it is through His Paternity that we share a spirit of brotherhood.  
Guadium et Spes goes on to say that: 
                                                          
202 Gaudium Et Spes. [Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World] Pope Paul VI. December 7, 1965. 
(Accessed December 15, 2014. http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html). 24 
203 Human love points to something beyond itself; to the divine which it can never fully grasp—though it will 
forever long.  William Hoye addressed this reality in his article, “Human Love as Unfulfilling Union According to 
St. Thomas Aquinas.”  Hoye writes that “the union sought by love [requires] divine being, which alone has the 
necessary ontological structure to bring about a union in which union and its reflection attain the longed-for 
fulfillment.  Therefore, in the present human condition love is opened to a kind of union that can be attained only in 
the mode of eschatological hope.  Love awakens a vision which animates hope.  This dimension is necessarily 
eschatological.  Nonetheless, the fact that the experience of love awakens a vision in us which can find no satisfying 
fulfillment in this life is purposeful.  We dream of finding someone who is completely one with us.  Neither is the 
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For this reason, love for God and neighbor is the first and greatest commandment. Sacred 
Scripture, however, teaches us that the love of God cannot be separated from love of neighbor: "If 
there is any other commandment, it is summed up in this saying: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as 
thyself.... Love therefore is the fulfillment of the Law." To men growing daily more dependent on 
one another, and to a world becoming more unified every day, this truth proves to be of 
paramount importance.204 
 
The language used in the cited passage205 makes direct reference to the very same language by 
which friendship has been defined by Aristotle.  But notice the difference; love of God precedes 
love of neighbor.  The love by which we love our neighbor flows out of our love for God so that 
as we seek God’s friendship for ourselves, we seek it for our neighbors also.   
In the parable of the Good Samaritan, “Jesus extends the term ‘neighbor’ [until it is 
essentially synonymous with] mankind.”206  The priest and the Levite were justified [by Israel’s 
purity laws]207 in passing up the poor assault-victim on the road.  So, in a sense, they weren’t 
doing wrong in their own minds.  They may not have even had their conscience pricking them to 
act, since doing what might seem to us to be the right thing would have violated their laws.208  
But by broadening the boundaries of the term “neighbor” Jesus now compels us to see each 
person as an “other self.”   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
dream fulfilled for the present nor is it in vain.” William J. Hoye, “Human Love as Unfulfilling Union According to 
St. Thomas Aquinas.” (Schwerpunkt: Systematische Theologie, unter besonderer Berucksichtigung der 
Theologischen Anthropologie, http://hoye.de/aq/love.pdf): 8. 
204 Gaudium et Spes, 24 
205 Romans 13:9-10; cf. 1 John 4:20 
206 Katharine Doob Sakenfeld. The New Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible. (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 2006) 535. 
207 Deuteronomy 6:4-5; Leviticus 19:18 
208 Scott Hahn and Curtis Mitch. Ignatius Catholic Study Bible New Testament. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
2010). 129 (footnote for Luke 10:27). 
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To love the “other” as you love your-self is the kind of love that Aristotle defines as 
reciprocated in true friendship.  It is the kind of friendship he claims is very rare and only 
possible between the virtuous.209  But to actually be friendship that love must also be both 
reciprocated and communicated.  Yet, the Lord asks us to extend this love to others as freely as 
the Samaritan in His parable did.  It is crucial to notice that what Jesus is doing is commanding 
His followers to imitate divine love—which extends benevolence regardless of how it is 
received.     
Both the love of neighbor and the love of God fall under the domain of charity.  Charity 
is “a theological virtue that causes us to love God above all things, for His own sake, in the way 
in which He loves Himself, and to love the neighbor for God’s sake.”210  The two objects of this 
virtue are God and one’s neighbor.  Now, one cannot have the fullness of friendship with several 
other persons in the sense of loving each of those persons for their own sakes; human creatures 
are limited.  Yet, the command of Jesus Christ to extend this radical form of friendship to our 
neighbors—essentially to all people—is facilitated by loving our neighbors for the sake of 
God.211  In this way, we authentically love friends, acquaintances, strangers—and even 
enemies—for God’s sake. 
If love of God precedes love of neighbor and the love that we extend to other humans is 
extended for the sake of our love for God, then this reality has significant implications on the 
relationship of spousal friendship.  It is precisely by loving one’s spouse for God’s sake that he 
most perfectly loves the other spouse.  Yet, this requires that a relationship of friendship exists 
                                                          
209 Aristotle, 1156b 
210 Tanquerey, 568; cf. Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Virtues, 131 
211 cf. Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Virtues, 133 
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between that individual and God.  At least for the most intimate manifestation of a relationship 
of spousal friendship, then, it is necessary that each foster an intimate friendship with God.212  
In light of these realities, we can more fully appreciate the 24th paragraph of Gaudium et 
Spes:  
Indeed, the Lord Jesus, when He prayed to the Father, "that all may be one. . . as we are one" 
(John 17:21-22) opened up vistas closed to human reason, for He implied a certain likeness 
between the union of the divine Persons, and the unity of God's sons in truth and charity. This 
likeness reveals that man, who is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself, cannot 
fully find himself except through a sincere gift of himself.213 
 
God has placed within us something of Himself—the image of God—by which we only truly 
experience flourishing through self-gift.  This gift of self is characteristic of the love by which 
God loves from all eternity.  We are called to imitate the Triune relationship of total self-gift 
made in love by extending that love to our neighbor—essential to the entire human family.  It is 
through the loving exchange of total self-gift that unity becomes possible from a multiplicity of 
persons.  All persons are called to imitate this divine love.  Yet, in a special way, married persons 
imitate the Triune love in the mutual exchange of betrothed-love.  The most perfect way by 
which spouses can manifest betrothed love, as is indicated by the above discussion of the nature 
of love, is for each spouse to love the other and to make a total gift of self to the other for the 
very sake of their love for God for His own sake.  This is why marriage is a vocation. 
 
                                                          
212 Of course, if the most intimate manifestation of a relationship of spousal friendship is possible for the spouses 
only by fostering intimate relationships of friendship with God, then it follows that only Christians are capable of the 
most intimate manifestations of spousal friendship.  Now, this is not to say that non-Christian spouses cannot have 
friendships with one another that are genuinely intimate.  But it does entail that Christians are capable—by virtue of 
their intimacy with God Himself—to be caught up in an objectively deeper friendship with their spouses. 
213 Gaudium et Spes, 24 
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Friendship with God sustains spousal friendship 
By imitating divine love, we become more like God.  This is ultimately the end to which our 
actions direct us when we pursue our truest happiness: to become like God.  Yet, the effects of 
the sin of Adam and Eve remain as an obstacle to attaining that end.  By taking the forbidden 
fruit, Adam and Eve refused to acknowledge God’s sovereignty over them as creatures before 
their Creator—who determines what is good and what is evil.  Instead, they sought the power 
proper only to the Creator and rejected the objective order established by God.  In all of this, they 
refused obedience.   
Becoming more like God is intrinsic to our flourishing.  But Adam and Eve grasped at 
divinity rather than awaiting the reception of it from God as a divine gift that would have made 
them like obedient children before their loving God, like Jesus Christ who did not grasp at 
divinity but was obedient even unto death.214  By this grasping, Man “chose himself over and 
against God, against the requirements of creaturely status and therefore against his own good.”215  
As a consequence of this choice, our first parents transmitted a wounded nature on to their 
descendants which is deprived of original holiness.216  For this reason, we must now purify our 
love so that it more fully reflects divine love.   
                                                          
214 cf. “Christ Jesus, who, though he was in the form of God, did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped, 
but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being born in the likeness of men.  And being found in human 
form he humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even death on a cross” (Philippians 2:5b-8, RSV). 
215 Catholic Church, 398 
216 cf. Catholic Church, 417, 419 
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The purification of eros 
Modern secular culture has poisoned eros love through the exultation of sensual pleasure.217  By 
examining the concept of eros as it is understood and as it has been understood through the ages, 
Pope Benedict XVI identified two things about the nature of eros love in his encyclical, Deus 
Caritas Est: 
First, there is a certain relationship between love and the Divine: love promises infinity, 
eternity—a reality far greater and totally other than our everyday existence. Yet we have also 
seen that the way to attain this goal is not simply by submitting to instinct. Purification and 
growth in maturity are called for; and these also pass through the path of renunciation. Far from 
rejecting or “poisoning” eros, they heal it and restore its true grandeur.218 
 
Through purification and growth in maturity, the grandeur of eros love is restored.  From the 
creation accounts of Genesis, we know that “eros is somehow rooted in man’s very nature.”219  
But Benedict argues that a second crucial point can be seen in the Genesis account.  The account 
shows that eros love directs the man and woman toward marriage and in marriage it fulfills its 
deepest purpose.  He writes: 
From the standpoint of creation, eros directs man towards marriage, to a bond which is unique 
and definitive; thus, and only thus, does it fulfil its deepest purpose. Corresponding to the image 
of a monotheistic God is monogamous marriage. Marriage based on exclusive and definitive love 
becomes the icon of the relationship between God and his people and vice versa. God's way of 
loving becomes the measure of human love. This close connection between eros and marriage in 
the Bible has practically no equivalent in extra-biblical literature.220 
 
Thus, as the couple purifies the expression of eros love in their marriage, they increasingly 
imitate divine love more perfectly.  Through this purification, the image of God expressed by 
                                                          
217 Walter Schu. “Benedict XVI Saves Eros.” Homiletic and Pastoral Review(April 2007) 10-11; cf. Benedict, 3, 5 
218 Benedict XVI, 5 
219 Benedict XVI, 11 
220 Benedict XVI, 11 
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that love is more perfectly manifest in their relationship with one another.  This reality is 
significant for the flourishing of both spouses.  But its importance also extends to their children 
and other friends and family with whom they are in relationship, since the exclusivity expressed 
in eros love reveals the image of God’s oneness and reflects the relationship between God and 
His people.   
But how is the purification of eros love accomplished?  While eros love is purified 
through agape love, Fr. Stephen Brett argues that philia love—the love of friendship—facilitates 
the proper environment for that purification and the exercise of eros love.221  Within the context 
of their mutual extension of benevolence (characteristic of friendship), the spouses find 
themselves in a safe environment in which their mutual vulnerability and care for one another 
facilitates the purification needed for their love to more purely mirror the love of God.  But 
friendship with God specifically facilitates the friendship of spouses since (as even the ancient 
philosophers believed of friendship) the friend becomes like his friend, and, to be more like God 
is to be more capable of entering into the kind of benevolent love characteristic of friendship.  In 
Deus Caritas Est, Benedict goes on to say:  
Earlier we spoke of the process of purification and maturation by which eros comes fully into its 
own, becomes love in the full meaning of the word. It is characteristic of mature love that it calls 
into play all man's potentialities; it engages the whole man, so to speak. Contact with the visible 
manifestations of God's love can awaken within us a feeling of joy born of the experience of 
being loved. But this encounter also engages our will and our intellect. Acknowledgment of the 
living God is one path towards love, and the “yes” of our will to his will unites our intellect, will 
and sentiments in the all- embracing act of love. But this process is always open-ended; love is 
never “finished” and complete; throughout life, it changes and matures, and thus remains faithful 
                                                          
221 Brett writes that: “Any experience of eros that jeopardizes or betrays authentic friendship demeans and distorts 
the life of the subject.  It is philia that prevents eros from becoming, paradoxically, an amorphous abstraction.  
Philia provides parameters of authenticity (for instance, virtue, benevolence, a mutual search for a real good, 
reciprocal communication, and a measure of equality) that characterize eros at its finest, on the ascent to agape, 
rather than at its nadir, prepared to descend into lust.  Apart from Christian revelation, Aristotle correctly linked 
friendship with happiness” (Brett, 16).   
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to itself. Idem velle atque idem nolle (Sallust, De coniuratione Catilinae, XX, 4.)—to want the 
same thing, and to reject the same thing—was recognized by antiquity as the authentic content of 
love: the one becomes similar to the other, and this leads to a community of will and thought. The 
love-story between God and man consists in the very fact that this communion of will increases in 
a communion of thought and sentiment, and thus our will and God's will increasingly coincide: 
God's will is no longer for me an alien will, something imposed on me from without by the 
commandments, but it is now my own will, based on the realization that God is in fact more 
deeply present to me than I am to myself (cf. Saint Augustine, Confessions, III, 6, 11: CCL 27, 
32.). Then self- abandonment to God increases and God becomes our joy (cf. Ps 73 [72]:23-
28).222  
 
This process of purification is a lifelong process; it is also a life-changing process.  The 
purification of eros is a lifelong process because love does not come to an end; rather, it changes, 
matures, and therefore keeps the process “open ended.”  But it is also a life-changing process 
because it entails a transformation—an elevation—of our creaturely wills to greater conformity 
with the divine will.  As friends become like one another, so through the purification of eros love 
we gradually take on, more and more, the will and thought of God.  This is the nature of the 
communion of will Benedict references.  Just as friends delight to become similar to one another, 
through abandoning ourselves and our rebellious wills to God, we actually begin to delight in 
God in an intimate way.223   
The citation of Augustine’s Confessions is very telling.  That God would be more deeply 
present in the individual than that individual is in himself demonstrates the destructive nature of 
sin in the life of the person—that by sinning the individual become less of his own true self.  Yet, 
                                                          
222 Benedict XVI, 17 
223 As Benedict says in the following paragraph: “Only my readiness to encounter my neighbor and to show him 
love makes me sensitive to God as well. Only if I serve my neighbor can my eyes be opened to what God does for 
me and how much he loves me… Love of God and love of neighbor are thus inseparable, they form a single 
commandment. But both live from the love of God who has loved us first. No longer is it a question, then, of a 
‘commandment’ imposed from without and calling for the impossible, but rather of a freely-bestowed experience of 
love from within, a love which by its very nature must then be shared with others. Love grows through love” 
(Benedict XVI, 18). 
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despite the presence of corruption and disorder, God has placed within us a profound desire for 
the transcendent by which we are compelled toward the truth and all that is truly good.  Although 
one may still choose against our deepest desires, they will continue to tug at the heart and 
challenge the direction of his life until he experiences the transformation needed to reorient 
himself back to God.   
 
Marriage as a vocation 
Christian marriage is a vocation.224  It is the specific path discerned and chosen by the spouses 
through which they strive toward heaven.225  But marriage is also a sacrament;226 it supplies 
special graces to the spouses for living their vocation well.  These sanctifying graces help the 
spouses to live in right relationship with one another and with God.227   
The love of spouses is not reducible to a sensual desire; it entails a firm commitment of 
the will to persevere in love through good times and bad—even when sensual desires seem far 
                                                          
224 The Catechism of the Catholic Church says that “the vocation to marriage is written in the very nature of man 
and woman as they came from the hand of the Creator.” Catholic Church, 1603.  
225 Since it has a role in God’s eternal plan, “marriage is already holy as a human reality.”  A. G. Martimort. The 
Church at Prayer Volume III: The Sacraments. (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1988) 206. 
226 In New Testament times, “Jesus performed His first sign at a wedding feast (Jn 2:1-11), henceforth Marriage was 
to be ‘an efficacious sign of Christ’s presence.’  It was thus raised to the dignity of a sacrament, for Christ has come 
to perfect the order of creation, and grace builds on nature.  Therefore, Christ restored Marriage to its original purity, 
and bestowed the grace to carry out the demands which this involves.”  Paul Haffner. The Sacramental Mystery. 
(Herefordshire: Gracewing, 2008) 236. 
227 “This grace proper to the sacrament of Matrimony is intended to perfect the couple’s love and to strengthen their 
indissoluble unity.  By this grace, they help one another to attain holiness in their married life and in welcoming and 
educating their children” (Haffner, 254; cf. Catholic Church, 1641). 
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removed from the spousal experience.228  This love is a reflection of God’s love; but since they 
are imitating divine love while they are themselves disordered by sin, the couples need the graces 
accompanying the sacrament to sustain their commitment.  By maintaining genuine friendship 
with God, the spouses remain close to the source which their own love must imitate to be pure.  
But as friends, the spouses ought to mutually desire the other to have deep friendship with God 
and to live in right relationship with Him.229  Through the lens of this friendship, they can make 
sense of the Pauline passage from Ephesians 5: 
Be subject to one another out of reverence for Christ. Wives, be subject to your husbands, as to 
the Lord. For the husband is the head of the wife as Christ is the head of the church, his body, and 
is himself its Savior. As the church is subject to Christ, so let wives also be subject in everything 
to their husbands. Husbands, love your wives, as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for 
her, that he might sanctify her, having cleansed her by the washing of water with the word, that 
he might present the church to himself in splendor, without spot or wrinkle or any such thing, that 
she might be holy and without blemish. Even so husbands should love their wives as their own 
bodies. He who loves his wife loves himself. For no man ever hates his own flesh, but nourishes 
and cherishes it, as Christ does the church, because we are members of his body. "For this reason 
a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one 
flesh." This mystery is a profound one, and I am saying that it refers to Christ and the 
church; however, let each one of you love his wife as himself, and let the wife see that she 
respects her husband.230 
 
Husbands and wives are called to mutual subjection in imitation of the love of Jesus Christ for 
His Church.  The love with which Jesus Christ Himself loved is the example they are called to 
imitate in loving one another; Jesus loved the Church literally unto death.  Therefore, husbands 
                                                          
228 Dietrich Von Hildebrand writes that: “Marriage is a reality in the objective order which is constituted only by a 
solemn act and presupposes a formal act of the will: the two partners give themselves expressly to each other, fully 
sanctioning this surrender for their entire lifetime” (Von Hidenbrand, 21-22). 
229 As was mentioned in the previous chapter of this essay, McNamara finds that there are four characteristics of 
Augustine’s fundamentally Christian version of friendship that develop out of the Pagan ethos: (1) that God is 
Himself the author of friendship and the one who enables us to enter into this kind of relationship; (2) friendships 
will find true stability only in Him; (3) the friendship of Christians is transformed through grace, surpassing the 
ideals of Pagan friendship such that the good pursued is supernaturally virtue and eternal beatitude; (4) friendship is 
not perfected in this life, but in the life to come (cf. McNamara, 196-197).   
230 Ephesians 5:21-33 
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and wives are commanded be Jesus to lay down their lives in love for the other.  About midway 
through this passage, Paul even uses the language of benevolent love—reminiscent of Aristotle 
and Aquinas’ definitions of friendship—for the relationship that the spouses must have for one 
another.  Thus, it is through their love for one another that they imitate the love of Christ; it is 
through their love of Christ that they have the strength to imitate His love.231 
The language of the mutual subjectivity of husbands and wives is a Gospel reality.  
When, in the 19th chapter of Matthew’s Gospel, Jesus is approached by the Pharisees about 
whether it is lawful for a man to divorce his wife for any cause, Jesus defends the sanctity of 
marriage by arguing that, “from the beginning it was not so” (Matthew, 19:8, RSV).  Jesus’ 
argument to the Pharisees began with the Genesis account of the creation of Man as male and 
female, and that by the union of man and woman, the two become one flesh.232   
Certain things—fully human things—are distinctly expressed in either the masculine or 
feminine expressions of humanity that are not present in the other; this is a fact.  For example, 
men do not naturally have a womb in which to carry a child—the sexual organs of man and 
woman are different.  The differences between man and woman have led some to believe that an 
inequality exists between men and women.  The language of mutual subjectivity would seem to 
suggest—at least to modern secular readers—that Christianity itself is proposing such an 
inequality between husbands and wives.  Although the inequality of men and women may have 
seemed to be a matter of fact in the ancient world, it is not at all what is being argued for by 
Christianity in the Pauline text to the Ephesians.   
                                                          
231 cf. Saint Francis De Sales, 160-161 
232 cf. Matthew 19:4-5 
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Even the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle believed that there was an inequality 
between men and women.  Yet, he also believed that friendship was possible between spouses.233  
Thus, he located the relationship of spousal friendship within the domain of relationships of 
inequality—where a superior (the man in this case) essentially humbles himself to facilitate the 
equality needed for friendship with his inferior (the woman in this case).234  Friendships between 
a superior and an inferior require that the superior be of superior virtue if there is to be equality 
in the friendship.235   The greater portion of virtue possessed by one party allows friendship to 
form between him and the one inferior to him in virtue.  In these relationships, the goods 
exchanged between parties are not identical; each party exercises a different virtue and a 
different function, and the causes of love between each vary as well.236  Yet, while Aristotle 
manages to argue for the possibility of friendship between men and women as a relationship of 
                                                          
233 Aristotle, 1158b 
234 The inequality specifically of man and woman—due to the alleged inferiority of the female sex—leads Aristotle 
to place men and women into the category of inequality.  However, this does not seem to inhibit the spousal 
relationship from being a friendship of virtue.  Fullam writes that “While marriage is not a subject of special 
attention for Aristotle, he recognizes that marriage may be a friendship of virtue, even though the spouses are 
unequal from the outset.  Due to his faulty moral anthropology of natural male superiority, he does not consider 
whether (opposite-sex) spouses might offset each other’s weaknesses mutually – such equality is more a matter of 
male-male (or female-female) relationships only.  But virtue is forged in friendship” (Fullam, 667). 
 To the contrary of Aristotle’s misconception about the inequality of men and women, Saint John Paul II 
wrote in Mulieris Dignitatem that, “Christ's attitude to women confirms and clarifies, in the Holy Spirit, the truth 
about the equality of man and woman. One must speak of an essential ‘equality’, since both of them - the woman as 
much as the man - are created in the image and likeness of God. Both of them are equally capable of receiving the 
outpouring of divine truth and love in the Holy Spirit. Both receive his salvific and sanctifying ‘visits.’” (Mulieris 
Dignitatem, 16). 
235 “Friendship…consists more in loving; and people who love their friends are praised; hence, it would seem, 
loving is the virtue of friends.  And so friends whose love corresponds to their friends’ worth are enduring friends 
and have an enduring friendship.  This above all is the way for unequals as well as equals to be friends, since this is 
the way for them to be equalized” (Aristotle, 1159a-1159b). 
236 cf. Aristotle, 1158b 
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inequality, the distinctively Christian contribution made to the present discussion is that spouses 
may enter into a relationship of friendship as equals.   
In the book of Genesis, God created the human race male and female and saw that what 
He had made was “very good.”237  In his book On the Good of Marriage, Saint Augustine 
explained that the very fact that Eve was made from Adam’s side indicates their equality.238  It 
should be noted that Augustine was reading Genesis as a Christian informed by the Gospel.239  
That same Gospel informed Paul’s letter to the Ephesians (cited above) as well as Pope John 
Paul II’s Apostolic Letter Mulieris Dignitatem.  He writes that: 
The biblical description in the Book of Genesis outlines the truth about the consequences of man's 
sin, as it is shown by the disturbance of that original relationship between man and woman which 
corresponds to their individual dignity as persons. A human being, whether male or female, is a 
person, and therefore, "the only creature on earth which God willed for its own sake"; and at the 
same time this unique and unrepeatable creature "cannot fully find himself except through a 
sincere gift of self".  Here begins the relationship of "communion" in which the "unity of the two" 
and the personal dignity of both man and woman find expression.240 
 
That Man’s personal dignity is experienced through the relationship of communion and unity is 
very much like what has been argued earlier in this essay.  Human creatures are social creatures.  
A human life without interpersonal exchange is a life that suffers a grave privation.  Yet, John 
                                                          
237 Genesis 1:31, RSV 
238 cf. Genesis 2:21-22; Augustine writes that “even [man and wife] God did not create as separate individuals and 
then unite them as strangers by birth, but he fashioned the wife from the husband, and signaled the strength of their 
union by the flank from which she was drawn and formed; for those who walk together, and together observe the 
direction which they are taking, are joined side by side in unity.  The next link in the chain of community is children, 
the sole worthy outcome not of the union between male and female, but of sexual intercourse; for even without such 
sexual association there could exist a true union of friendship between the two sexes, with the one governing and the 
other obeying.” Augustine, De Bono Coniugali, 3 
239 Another instance where Jesus spoke of the sanctity of marriage is drawn from Luke’s Gospel: “Everyone who 
divorces his wife and marries another commits adultery, and he who marries a woman divorced from her husband 
commits adultery” (Luke 16:18, RSV).  Similarly, in Matthew 5:28 Jesus tells His hearers that anyone who even 
looks with lust at a woman has already committed the sin of adultery with her in his heart.   
240 John Paul II, Mulieris Dignitatem, 10 
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Paul II is here writing specifically of the exchange between spouses.  In virtue of the two being 
male and female, a potential for unity exists through which the two become one.  In the context 
of this interpersonal communion, the woman and man offer one another a total gift of self.   
This passage also speaks of man and woman each as full participants in the dignity of 
persons.  It is by each making a sincere gift of self that the personal subjectivity of each is both 
respected and perfected.  Yet, he also notes that sin has a negative influence on the spousal 
relationship.241  The equality of the spouses is attacked by sinful inclinations.  Still, this equality 
is essential to the reciprocity of love exchanged in spousal friendship.  To this end, John Paul II 
writes that “Gospel ‘equality’, the ‘equality’ of women and men in regard to the ‘mighty works 
of God’—manifested so clearly in the words and deeds of Jesus of Nazareth—constitutes the 
most obvious basis for the dignity and vocation of women in the Church and in the world.”242  
The dynamic nature of this equality is a crucial theme emphasized in the Gospels.  John Paul II 
even goes so far as to call it the basis for the dignity and vocation of women.   
                                                          
241 John Paul II writes that: “This statement in Genesis 3:16 is of great significance. It implies a reference to the 
mutual relationship of man and woman in marriage. It refers to the desire born in the atmosphere of spousal love 
whereby the woman's "sincere gift of self" is responded to and matched by a corresponding "gift" on the part of the 
husband. Only on the basis of this principle can both of them, and in particular the woman, "discover themselves" as 
a true "unity of the two" according to the dignity of the person. The matrimonial union requires respect for and a 
perfecting of the true personal subjectivity of both of them. The woman cannot become the "object" of "domination" 
and male "possession". But the words of the biblical text directly concern original sin and its lasting consequences 
in man and woman. Burdened by hereditary sinfulness, they bear within themselves the constant "inclination to sin", 
the tendency to go against the moral order which corresponds to the rational nature and dignity of man and woman 
as persons. This tendency is expressed in a threefold concupiscence, which Saint John defines as the lust of the eyes, 
the lust of the flesh and the pride of life (cf. 1 Jn 2:16). The words of the Book of Genesis quoted previously (3: 16) 
show how this threefold concupiscence, the "inclination to sin", will burden the mutual relationship of man and 
woman.”  John Paul II, Mulieris Dignitatem, 10. 
242 John Paul II, Mulieris Dignitatem, 16 
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Yet, difference still seems to intuitively entail inequality.  It must at least entail some 
variation through which one thing is unique from another.  Difference within the human race has 
led to the imposition of many unjust practices believed to be rooted in inequalities between 
various ethnic or religious groups or even among men and women.  Yet, can there be an equality 
of difference?  In her article “Equality, Gender, and John Paul II” Dr. Mary Lemmons argues that 
there is.243  While difference entails a variation of expression, it does not necessarily presuppose 
a qualitative disparity between things or persons participating in the same genus.244  There is, for 
instance, a sense in which Beethoven and Michelangelo share an equality that is based upon a 
commonality of excellence—though the excellence is analogous—by which each artist is a 
master of his discipline of art: music and painting.245 Lemmons writes that:  
[The] human mission to love in the image of the Trinity bestows upon femininity and masculinity 
their proper meanings: the meaning of femininity is to facilitate woman’s ability to enter into 
relationships of fruitful love and unity between equals; the meaning of masculinity is likewise to 
facilitate man’s ability to enter into relationships of fruitful love and unity between equals. 
Sexuality is for facilitating a Trinitarian-like love.246 
 
The reality is that sex matters—human masculinity and femininity offer distinct—though 
equal—contributions to love and relationship.  Lemmons articulates three ways by which spousal 
unification in love images the triune God: (1) “by being a unit constituted by love; (2) by being a 
fecund unit that is not closed in on itself but is turned outward in the brining forth of new life; 
                                                          
243 Lemmons. “Equality, Gender, and John Paul II,” 111 
244 Lemmons writes that: “On the one hand, it does not seem possible for the different to be equal, because the 
different—as such—lack some commonality whereby they can be compared and known as equal, or even as 
inferior/ superior. Accordingly, ‘an equality of difference’ would be oxymoronic, if it did not presuppose some type 
of commonality whereby comparisons could be made” (Lemmons, “Equality, Gender, and John Paul II,” 111). 
245 cf. Lemmons, “Equality, Gender, and John Paul II,” 112; Lemmons writes: “since their excellences are different, 
their equality is analogical” (Lemmons, “Equality, Gender, and John Paul II,” 112). 
246 Lemmons, “Equality, Gender, and John Paul II,” 113 
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and (3) by being a unit of distinct equals.”247  As a unit constituted by love, the spousal exchange 
of betrothed love within the context of marriage imitates the total self-gift made and renewed by 
the divine Persons of the Trinity at every moment for all eternity.  The fecundity of marriage is 
itself a fruit of the salvific mission of Jesus Christ whereby He repairs the damage Original Sin 
caused to the dispositions of men and women to one another;248 fruitful love extends itself freely 
to the other and does not turn in upon itself.249  By virtue of their distinction, the man and woman 
reflect the very distinctiveness of the Persons of the Trinity; by their equality, they reflect the 
common divinity of all three Persons of the Trinity.   
                                                          
247 Lemmons, “Equality, Gender, and John Paul II,” 113 
248 Later on in the same article, Lemmons writes that: “It is only Jesus Christ, who is able to heal—by His life and 
by His grace—the rift between men and women that obscured the ability of both men and women to see the true 
dignity and equality of each other and, thereby, to enter into paired relationships of love that image the Trinity. Love 
is best between equals, teaches the Trinity. Thus, Jesus Christ—by restoring the equality of woman with man and by 
liberating woman from her own enslaving desires—enables the sexes to be equal love-gifts for each other. Jesus 
Christ thus made it possible for men and women to lay down their lives in love—without compromising their 
equality, sexuality, or dignity. As a result, sexual gender roles can now be empowering by bringing their participants 
into the greatest mysteries of joyful love” (Lemmons, “Equality, Gender and John Paul II,” 121-122). 
249 cf. Genesis 3:16 wherein we are told that Original Sin damages the inclinations of spouses toward one another.   
Through sin, the husband becomes inclined to dominate his wife; similarly, through sin the wife’s tendency toward 
her husband becomes an inwardly focused expression of love through which she submits to his lordship over her.  
Neither of these inclinations reflects the good for which we were made, nor do they imitate the love by which God 
loves (cf. Lemmons, “Equality, Gender, and John Paul II,” 115). 
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Mutual submission and resignation of the will 
Recalling the role of spousal friendship in facilitating betrothed love and helping it to flourish 
reminds us of the difficulties involved in such a union.  It is clear that the total self-gift 
exchanged in betrothal is confronted by dangers from without and within.250  Even the spouses 
themselves are affected by Original Sin.  Yet, the two are entrusted by their Creator to one 
another and called to reflect His image more intimately through the purification and mutual 
exchange of their love.251 
By virtue of the exchange of their total self-gift through betrothed love, the spouses 
reflect the very image of God’s love for Mankind.  It is, however, also part of God’s command to 
husbands and wives to love one another as Jesus Christ loved the Church, as was described in the 
previous chapter of this essay.  The love of Jesus Christ is both the model to be imitated and the 
medium through which the imitation is accomplished.  Jesus Christ made a total gift of Himself 
for love of the Church out of loving obedience to God His Father.252  The obedience of Jesus 
Christ to God the Father was not an expression of slavish subjection of an inferior to his 
superior; it did not arise from slavish servitude, but from love.  The Father and Jesus Christ were 
                                                          
250 The statistics listed in the Introduction to this essay give empirical evidence of these dangers. 
251 John Paul II addresses this reality as he reflects on the scene from John’s Gospel where an adulterous woman is 
brought before Jesus to test Him.  “The woman was entrusted to the man… The man was also entrusted by the 
Creator to the woman - they were entrusted to each other as persons made in the image and likeness of God himself. 
This entrusting is the test of love, spousal love. In order to become "a sincere gift" to one another, each of them has 
to feel responsible for the gift. This test is meant for both of them - man and woman - from the "beginning". After 
original sin, contrary forces are at work in man and woman as a result of the threefold concupiscence, the "stimulus 
of sin". They act from deep within the human being.”  John Paul II, Mulieris Dignitatem, 14 
252 cf. Philippians 2:6-8; Hebrews 5:8; Galatians 1:3-4; John 17 
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one in will through their mutual love for one another.  As Archbishop Fulton Sheen once wrote, 
“obedience is servility only to those who have not understood the spontaneity of love.”253 
 
Summary 
Therefore, friendship with God protects spousal friendship; it helps both of the spouses to live 
their own spousal relationship better since it is the benevolent love of God that they are called to 
imitate in their own vocational calling.  Friendship with God may also become the good willed 
by the spouses for themselves and for one another. While friendship with God is not a 
prerequisite to spousal friendship, it is, nevertheless, the medium through which each spouse can 
attain his own ultimate flourishing.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
253 Archbishop Fulton Sheen wrote of the nature of obedience in his book The World’s First Love.  He says: 
“Obedience does not mean the execution of orders that are given by a drill sergeant.  It springs, rather, from the love 
of an order, and love of Him who gave it.  The merit of obedience is less in the act than in the love; the submission, 
the devotion, and the service which obedience implies are not born of servitude, but are rather effects that spring 
from and are unified by love.  Obedience is servility only to those who have not understood the spontaneity of love” 
(Sheen, 84). 
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Conclusion 
 
This essay sought to explore whether or not friendship is necessary for the spousal relationship 
or if romantic passion suffices.  A relationship of romantic passion, it has been argued, is an 
insubstantial context for the marital commitment; it is a kind of relationship which tends toward 
disintegration by reducing the spouse to the mere means and not an end in him/her-self.  The 
kind of intimate relationship that safeguards the dignity of both persons—acknowledging that 
they are not merely means but subjects who pursue ends themselves—is friendship.  Therefore, it 
was then argued that friendship is necessary for marriage.  It is within spousal friendship that the 
good of the each spouse is willed for his own sake.  The final argument made in this essay was 
that friendship with God plays a crucial role in protecting spousal friendship.  While spousal 
friendship is possible without the spouses pursuing a deliberately intimate relationship with God, 
the deepest and most intimate friendship of the spouses is not possible except when the spouses 
are also friends of God.  Through this friendship with God, each spouse is able to more perfectly 
love the other as God loves—since the love that they express to one another is a reflection of the 
love between the Persons of the Trinity, this perfection of love through relationship with God 
greatly aids their mutual goal.   
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Friendship, thus, is necessary for marriage.  But even the friendship of the spouses points 
and guides them toward relationship with God.  Becoming more like God is the ultimate end of 
all human life.  Each person has a specific vocation through which he is drawn by God toward a 
communion that alone can satisfy the deepest longings of the human heart.  Spousal friendship 
facilitates the expression of the love characteristic of married life (betrothed love) through which 
spouses are caught up in imitation of the divine exchange of total self-gift.  It is in this way that 
those who live the vocation of married life sojourn through the world to God.  While the ideal is 
often difficult to faithfully live, through spousal friendship the spouses can rely upon the mutual 
help exchanged with one another in their journey.   
 
A closer look at the arguments of this essay 
In the first chapter of this essay, three reasons have been offered as to why romantic passion 
cannot alone sustain the spousal relationship.  The first is that romantic passion is based on 
sensuality or sentimentality and these constitute friendships of pleasure or utility which 
necessarily change over time, as Aristotle points out.  The second reason is that relationships 
based solely on romantic passion permit the objectification of the other that dehumanizes the 
other, as Pope Benedict XVI points out.  The third reason is that relationships merely of romantic 
passion lack the personal character of love whereby spouses help each other to grow in virtue, as 
Pope Pius XI points out. 
The second chapter of this essay has argued that friendship is indeed crucial to the 
spousal relationship for two reasons.  The first is to prevent disintegration because the harms of 
the first chapter of this essay are avoided only by willing the other’s good in friendship.  The 
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second reason is to facilitate the growth and flourishing of betrothed love, which is a deeper 
expression of love toward which marriage is ordered (and which imitates the very love by which 
God loves us) insofar as it is the proper context for the fruitful expression of romantic passion.  
Therefore, given the importance of friendship to the relationship of the spouses and their good, it 
is necessary for marriage.   
The argument of the third chapter of this essay has proposed three reasons why spousal 
friendship is protected by friendship with God.  The first is that the love of God enables spouses 
to purify their love for one another.  The second reason is because divinely bestowed grace 
facilitates the purification of eros and because the very love of Jesus Christ enables the spouses 
to have the strength to imitate His love.  The third reason is that the love of God is itself the 
image imitated by the mutual subjection of betrothed love (cf. Ephesians 5:21-33) and the 
spouses learn the nature of this love through their friendship with God in conjunction with their 
own spousal friendship. 
 
Summary 
Therefore, this essay has argued for two kinds of friendship within the marital relationship: 
spousal friendship and friendship with God.  The first was argued to be essential to marriage.  
The second, while not strictly essential to the role of preserving spousal friendship, was argued 
to be crucial to the flourishing of the couple both individually and together.  To put the entire 
thesis essay succinctly: the first chapter has argued that romantic passion alone is insufficient for 
marriage; the second chapter has argued that the friendship of spouses is necessary; the third 
chapter has argued that friendship with God is important both individually and collectively: for 
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each person to form a properly integrated self, and for the spouses together to sustain the love 
and intimacy of their spousal friendship. 
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